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THE TRANSFORMATION OF INDIRECT

HARASSMENT IN THE

2 1 ST

CENTURY:

HARASSMENT TELEPHONE LAWS,
CYBERBULLYING, AND NEW WAYS OF
ANALYZING FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
I. INTRODUCTION

With the introduction of the Internet, smartphones, and the
continuing development of social media, our society has adopted new ways
of communicating that transcends our ancestor's imaginations.'
Nevertheless, with this transformation of online communication came a
new set of dangers, including identity theft, hacking, and online
harassment, which led to civil lawsuits and criminal cases of first
impression. 2 This conflict led to what is now known as "cyberbullying,"
1 See Alison Virginia King, Note, Constitutionality of Cyberbullying Laws: Keeping the
Online Playground Safe for Both Teens and Free Speech, 63 VAND. L. REv. 845, 846 (2010)
(signifying benefits and dangers of Internet). While the Internet creates a new virtual world that
provides numerous benefits for our society, such as endless amounts of news, easy access to
research, and social networking, it also brings about dangers such as cyberbullying that parents
and legislators alike must confront. Id. Nevertheless, "the even greater challenge ... is to balance
these vital protections with the equally compelling freedoms of speech, expression, and thought."
Id. See also Jerry Will & Clim Clayburn, The PsychologicalImpact of Cyber Bullying, U. Bus.
(Nov. 4, 2011), http://www.universitybusiness.com/article/psychological-impact-cyber-bullying
(noting high percentage of teenagers that go online). Specifically in 2007, 94% of teenagers aged
12 to 17 use the internet, 89% of these teens use the internet while at home, and 63% of them use
the internet daily. Id.; Meryl Ain,Increased Use of Smartphones Among Teens: What's a Parent
to Do?, HUFFINGTON POST (May 16, 2013, 12:27 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/merylain-edd/increased-use-of-smartpho b 2884442.html (explaining increase in use of smartphones
among teenagers between 2012 and 2013). In the United States, 78% of children aged 12 to 17
own a cellphone and one out of four teenagers uses his or her smartphone to surf the Internet. Id.
However, with the increased use of cellphones comes new hurdles for parents to control their
teenager's behavior that could include acts such as sexting and cyberbullying. Id.
2 See State v. Bishop, 774 S.E.2d 337, 343 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015) (signifying case of first
impression concerning constitutionality of cyberbullying statute). While the Internet is a virtual
world, it can have real-life consequences for many individuals faced with the dangers of identity
theft, hacking, and online harassment. King, supra note 1, at 846. See also Lisa M. Jones,
Kimberly J. Mitchell, & David Finkelhor, Online Harassment in Context: Trends from Three
Youth
Internet Safety Surveys, 3 PSYCHOL. OF VIOLENCE
53,
53
(2012),
http://www.unh.edu/ccrc/pdf/Online / 20Harassment / 20in%
/2OContext.pdf
(demonstrating
increase in online harassment for children and teenagers from 2000 to 2010). While children and
teenager's internet use rose drastically from 2000 to 2010, they also changed who they talked to:
a study measuring internet use characteristic among youth found that children talked to their
friends online more in 2010 than they talked to those they had just met online. Id. at 60.
Nevertheless, indirect harassment online has increased significantly as the rise in social media

2017]

TRANSFORMATION OF INDIRECT HARASSMENT

which has not been precisely defined.3 Provisions, however, have been in
place for other indirect modes of harassment such as the Federal
Harassment Telephone Law, which criminalizes perpetrators of harassing
telephone calls. 4 This provision sparked inspiration for present-day
sites have given children a new avenue in which to bully their fellow classmates. Id.at 64. See
also The Top Six Unforgettable Cyberbullying Cases Ever, NOBULLYING.COM,

http://nobullying.com/six-unforgettable-cyber-bullying-cases/ (last modified Mar. 26, 2017)
(emphasizing striking number of cyberbullying cases leading to suicide among teenagers). The
suicide of Ryan Halligan demonstrates one of numerous examples of suicide caused by
cyberbullying. Id. Halligan suffered from a lack of adequate motor skill development and
received special education services to help with this problem. Id. Because of these physical
struggles, Halligan was the target of bullying. Id. This bullying led to cyberbullying after
Halligan started communications with a female student. Id.However, the girl convinced him to
share personal information about himself, which she posted in her instant messaging exchanges
with friends; after finding this out, Halligan was distraught and hung himself in his family's
bathroom. Id. See generally What Is IndirectBullying? A Guide Released by NoBullying Today,
PRWEB (July 18, 2014), http://www.prweb.com/releases/2014/07/prweb12025232.htm (describing
bullying and distinguishing indirect bullying from direct bullying). When one is bullying
another, there is often a power struggle between the bully and the victim where the bully desires
to impose direct or indirect harm upon the victim. Id. Unlike direct bullying which involves
directly hurting another in a physical or emotional way, indirect bullying includes actions such as
excluding someone from an activity or spreading negative rumors about an individual either
offline or online. Id. These actions are indirect and do not directly attack another. Id.
Consequently, NoBullying.com and prweb.com call for more practical laws to prevent bullying
and for parents to teach their children about the negative effects of bullying both offline and
online. Id.
' See
Why
do
Kids
Cyberbully Each
Other?,
STOP
CYBERBULLYING,
http://www.stopcyberbullying.org/what is-cyberbullying-exactly.html (last visited Apr. 19,
2017) (providing definition of cyberbullying). Cyberbullying, according to stopbullying.org is
"when a child.., is tormented, threatened, harassed, humiliated, embarrassed, or otherwise
targeted by another child ...using the Internet, interactive and digital technologies or mobile
phones." Id. The site also provides examples of cyberbullying, which include text messages,
emails, and embarrassing rumors or photos posted on social media sites. See id.See generally

Justin Patchin, Summary of Our Cyberbullying Research (2004-2016), CYBERBULLYING
RESEARCH CENTER (Nov. 26, 2016), http://cyberbullying.org/summary-of-our-cyberbullyingresearch (demonstrating increase in cyberbullying over last decade). Studies conducted by
cyberbullying.org indicate that from May 2007 to August 2016, reports of cyberbullying rose

15%

from 18.8% to 33.8%. Id. In 2016, around 28%

of students stated they had been

cyberbullied at least once during their lifetime, while 16% stated they have cyberbullied other
students. Id.But see Shirvell v. Dep't of Attorney General, 866 N.W.2d 478, 490 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2015) (demonstrating cyberbullying argument carried out by adults). In Shirvell, Attorney
General Shirvell was conducting an anti-cyberbullying policy in Michigan public schools. See id.
However, when Solicitor General Restuccia discovered Shirvell had posted an anti-homosexual
blog, Restuccia claimed such actions contradicted the Attorney General's anti-cyberbullying
policy and was analogous to cyberbullying. Id.
4 See 47 U.S.C.S. § 223 (2017) (preventing obscene and harassing telephone calls). The
statute states, in pertinent part:
(a) Prohibited acts generally. Whoever
(1) in interstate or foreign communications
(A) by means of a telecommunications device knowingly
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cyberbullying statutes in various states.5 However, critics argue that these
cyberbullying statutes and the Telephone Harassment Law prohibit a broad
(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and
(ii) initiates the transmission of, any comment, request, suggestion,
proposal, image, or other communication which is obscene or child
pornography, with intent to abuse, threaten, or harass another person;
(B) by means of a telecommunications device knowingly
(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and
(ii) initiates the transmission of, any comment, request, suggestion,
proposal, image, or other communication which is obscene or child
pornography, knowing that the recipient of the communication is under
18 years of age, regardless of whether the maker of such
communication placed the call or initiated the communication;
(C) makes a telephone call or utilizes a telecommunications device,
whether or not conversation or communication ensues, without
disclosing his identity and with intent to abuse, threaten, or harass any
specific person;
(D) makes or causes the telephone of another repeatedly or
continuously to ring, with intent to harass any person at the called
number; or
(E) makes repeated telephone calls or repeatedly initiates
communication with a telecommunications device, during which
conversation or communication ensues, solely to harass any specific
person; or
(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under his control to be
used for any activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent that it be used for
such activity, shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, or imprisoned not
more than two years, or both.
Id.; see also United States v. Lampley, 573 F.2d 783, 787-88 (3d Cir. 1978) (discussing
constitutionality and purpose of 47 U.S.C. § 223). But see Sable Commc'ns of Cal. v. F.C.C.,
492 U.S. 115, 124 (1989) (holding provision under 47 U.S.C.S. § 223 inapplicable because it
controls
obscene telephone messages).
In Sable Commc'ns of Cal. v. FCC, Sable
Communications offered sexual telephone messages through Pacific Bell and charged customers
a fee for receiving the message. Id. at 117-18. However, in 1988, when 47 U.S.C. § 223(b)
prohibited indecent and obscene telephone messages, Sable Communications was upset as its
messages could be interpreted as obscene. Id. at 118. Nonetheless, the Court held that, because
the First Amendment does not protect against merely obscene speech, 47 U.S.C. § 223 was
unconstitutional. Id. at 124.
5 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-196 (2016) (prohibiting use of profane, vulgar, or lewd language
over telephone). The North Carolina statute states in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person: (1) To use in telephonic communications any
words or language of a profane, vulgar, lewd, lascivious or indecent character, nature
or connotation; (2) To use in telephonic communications any words or language
threatening to inflict bodily harm to any person or to that person's child, sibling,
spouse, or dependent or physical injury to the property of any person, or for the
purpose of extorting money or other things of value from any person; (3) To telephone
another repeatedly, whether or not conversation ensues, for the purpose of abusing,
annoying, threatening, terrifying, harassing or embarrassing any person at the called
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range of speech protected by the First Amendment. 6 While this prohibition
will decrease the amount of indirect harassment cases and ultimately lead
number; (4) To make a telephone call and fail to hang up or disengage the connection
with the intent to disrupt the service of another; (5) To telephone another and to
knowingly make any false statement concerning death, injury, illness, disfigurement,
indecent conduct or criminal conduct of the person telephoned or of any member of his
family or household with the intent to abuse, annoy, threaten, terrify, harass, or
embarrass; (6) To knowingly permit any telephone under his control to be used for any
purpose prohibited by this section. (b) Any of the above offenses may be deemed to
have been committed at either the place at which the telephone call or calls were made
or at the place where the telephone call or calls were received. For purposes of this
section, the term "telephonic communications" shall include communications made or
received by way of a telephone answering machine or recorder, telefacsimile machine,
or computer modem. (c) Anyone violating the provisions of this section shall be guilty
of a Class 2 misdemeanor.
Id.;
Bishop, 774 S.E.2d at 343 (demonstrating analogous nature of Harassing Telephone Law and
cyberbully statute). Similar to its Harassing Telephone Law, which criminalized repeated phone
calls that harassed or abused another, North Carolina's cyberbullying statute forbids the "act of
posting or encouraging another to post on the Internet with the intent to intimidate or torment." Id.
Such similarity between the two laws is valid since both the telephone and the Internet can be
used "as an instrumentality for communication." Id. States have also implemented bullying
policies to combat cyberbullying. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-21-34(a)(1)-(3) (2011). The Rhode
Island statute states in pertinent part that:
[T]he statewide [bullying] policy shall apply to all schools that are approved for the
purpose of § 16-9-1 and shall contain the following: (1) Descriptions of and statements
prohibiting bullying, cyber-bullying and retaliation of school; (2) Clear requirements
and procedures for students, staff, parents, guardians and others to report bullying or
retaliation; (3) A provision that reports of bullying or retaliation may be made
anonymously; provided, however, that no disciplinary action shall be taken against a
student solely on the basis of an anonymous report ....
Id. See Goldman, infra note 23 (noting Massachusetts has similar bullying policy for its public
schools).
6 See People v. Marquan M., 19 N.E.3d 480, 486 (N.Y. 2014) (criticizing Albany County
cyberbullying statute as it criminalizes speech outside popular understanding of cyberbullying).
Cyberbullying was defined in Albany County as:
[A]ny act of communicating or causing a communication to be sent by mechanical or
electronic means, including posting statements on the internet or through a computer or
email network, disseminating embarrassing or sexually explicit photographs;
disseminating private, personal, false or sexual information, or sending hate mail, with
no legitimate private, personal, or public purpose, with the intent to harass, annoy,
threaten, abuse, taunt, intimidate, torment, humiliate, or otherwise inflict significant
emotional ham on another person.
Id. at 484. Although the government has a compelling interest to protect children from harmful
information, and the above statute seeks to achieve this interest, it nevertheless represents a
'criminal prohibition of alarming breadth" as the text of the law criminalizes protected speech
that goes far beyond the normal understanding of cyberbullying. Id. at 486 (quoting United States
v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 474 (2010)). Consequently, the court determined that the statute was
invalid because it was contrary to the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. Id. at 488;
State v. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d 814, 822 (N.C. 2016) (holding North Carolina cyberbullying statute
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to a more peaceful society, our nation
must analyze these types of laws
7

critically before implementing them .
This note will: (I) examine the development of indirect harassment
laws from the Harassment Telephone Laws passed in the early 1930's to
present cyberbullying laws;8 (II) look to cases analyzing the validity of

as unconstitutional as it violates guarantee of freedom of speech). See generally Doug Linder,
Introduction to the Free Speech Clause, EXPLORING CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS,
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/firstaminto.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2017)
(defining right to free speech under First Amendment and different approaches in analyzing it).
The right to free speech under the First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend I. There are three
approaches in analyzing the right to free speech under the First Amendment: the absolutist
approach, the categorical approach, and the balancing approach. Id. The absolutist approach says
that Congress shall not make a law threating the freedom of speech. Id. Here, the question is
whether an individual's actions are either speech or conduct; and in some instances, like
screaming "fire," because the speech interconnects with an action that most likely will be
performed, then it is not speech and not protected under the right to free speech. Id. The
categorical approach states that speech can be broken down into categories; and if the speech is
determined as commercial speech or fighting words, then the speech is not protected under the
First Amendment. Id. Finally, the balancing approach says that in each instance, a court must
weigh the individual's interest in protecting one's right to free speech against the government's
interest in restricting the speech; and the preference is to rule in favor of the individual over the
government unless there is a strong government interest in prohibiting the speech. Id. Therefore,
because the Albany County cyberbullying statute in Marquan included numerous forms of
electronic speech that arguably were not connected to conduct or fighting words, and, thus,
fundamentally threatened the individual's right to free speech, the statute was unconstitutional
and could not be used to charge the high school student. 19 N.E.3d at 488.
7 See King, supra note 1, at 884 (emphasizing that legislators need to act quickly to address
cyberbullying problem plaguing nation). But see James Tucker, Free Speech and "Cyberbullying,"
Am. CIVIL
LEERTIS
UNION
(Jan.
16,
2008,
10:29
AM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/speakeasy/free-speech-and-cyber-bullying?redirect-blog/freespeech/free-speech-and-cyber-bullying (explaining cyberbullying as stacking deck against First
Amendment). In fact, Tucker suggests that society should not automatically try to implement
legislation to resolve the problem of offensive online speech. Id. Rather, parents should monitor
their children's online usage so that society can continue to promote the free exchange of
information, while simultaneously recognizing that online speech could benefit or hurt others. Id.
See also Stephanie Hanes, Anti-Bullying Laws: A Mom Dares to Critique the Social Trend, THE
CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE
MONITOR
(Sept. 25, 2012), http://www.csmonitor.com/TheCulture/Family/Modern-Parenthood/2012/0925/Anti-bullying-laws-A-mom-dares-to-critique-thesocial-trend (criticizing anti-bullying laws). Hanes notes that legislators first implemented
bullying statutes after the Columbine High School shooting in 1999; after this tragic event, state
legislatures throughout the country introduced or amended around 120 bills regarding bullying.
Id. However, most states have definitions of bullying that are usually not in conformity with the
"research-based" definition of bullying, which involves an intent to harm another, a power
struggle between the bullyer and the bullyee, etc. Id. In addition, states such as New Jersey have
implemented anti-bullying policies that threaten free speech and "interfere with the orderly
operation of the institution." Id. See also The Rise in Cyberbullying, Heard on All Things
Considered,
NPR
(Sept.
30,
2010,
3:00
PM),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.phpstoryId-130247610
[hereinafter The Rise in
Cyberbullying] (showing cyberbullying legislation not doing enough to charge perpetrators of
cyberbullying crimes).
' See infra Part II, A-B.

2017]

TRANSFORMATION OF INDIRECT HARASSMENT

these aforementioned laws, the issues arising out of these laws, and how
they alter our understanding of the First Amendment; 9 (III) argue that,
while these laws may have changed our understanding of the First
Amendment in beneficial ways, they may not be the best solution in
resolving indirect harassment;' 0 and (IV) the note will conclude that these
indirect harassment laws ultimately affect the First Amendment in a vital,
yet dangerous way. u
II. HISTORY
A. Telephone Harassment
The invention of the telephone has allowed individuals to
communicate with one another from across the globe in an inexpensive
way; but such an invention has also led to new ways for harassers to induce
fear upon others. 12 One of the first examples of telephone harassment
9 See infra Part III, A-B.
10 See infra Part IV.
n See infra Part V.
12 M. Sean Royall, Case Comment, Constitutionally Regulating Telephone Harassment:An
Exercise in Statutory Precision, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1403, 1403 (1989) (recognizing benefits and
problems with telephone). "[The telephone] provides convenient and virtually unlimited access
to people wherever they may work or reside, but this capability can also make the telephone an
'instrument for inflicting incalculable fear, abuse, annoyance, hardship, disgust, and grief on
innocent victims."' Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1109, 90th Cong. (1968)). See Andrea J.
Robinson, Note, A Remedial Approach to Harassment, 70 VA. L. REv. 507, 507-08 (1984)
(evaluating legal needs of harassment victims). Because there are various types of harassment by
telephone, such as harassment by creditors, harassment by ex-lovers, or harassment by teenage
bullies, the legal system's response is equally varied. Id. "Only by accounting for the diversity of
the harassers, their methods, and their victims' attitudes can one determine whether harassment
warrants legal sanctions and what remedial scheme may be appropriate." Id. See generally
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 269, § 14A (LexisNexis 2010) (representing legislation responding to
problems of harassment). The law states:
[W]hoever telephones another person or contacts another person by electronic
communication, or causes a person to be telephoned or contacted by electronic
communication, repeatedly, for the sole purpose of harassing, annoying or molesting
the person or the person's family, whether or not conversation ensues, or whoever
telephones or contacts a person repeatedly by electronic communication and uses
indecent or obscene language to the person, shall be punished by a fine of not more
than $500 or by imprisonment for not more than 3 months, or by both such a fine and
imprisonment.
Id. See Commonwealth v. Wilcox, 841 N.E.2d 1240, 1244 (Mass. 2006) (noting violation of §
14A because defendant charged with four counts of making annoying calls). In Wilcox, the
defendant called young girls at random and asked them to make videotapes of themselves for
him. ld. As a result, he was charged with four counts of making annoying or indecent phone calls
and two counts of accosting a person of the opposite sex; as such, the defendant was placed on
probation. Id. But see Commonwealth v. Wotan 665 N.E.2d 976, 976-77 (Mass. 1996)
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came in the late 1890's, when the first telephones were used by early
switchboard operators, who mainly consisted of "notoriously rude" teenage
boys.' 3 The problem of telephone harassment, nevertheless, expanded as
the telephone increased in popularity, which led to lawsuits against exlovers, stalkers, and others because of their "telephonic assaults" on
others. 14 As a result, federal and state legislators sought to pass laws to

crack down on this type of harassment.' 5
(reversing guilty ruling although defendant made annoying telephone calls). In Wotan, the court
explained that although it is a misdemeanor under G.L. ch. 269, section 14A to make a telephone
call merely to harass, annoy, or molest another, these calls must be made repeatedly to be
considered a crime. Id. Furthermore, even though Wotan made two calls to the Kegans where he
simply hung up, this was not enough to constitute "repeating" calls under the statute. Id.
13 See Jennifer Latson, The Woman Who Made History by Answering the Phone, TNwE (Sept.
1, 2015), http://time.com/4011936/emma-nutt/ (showing progress of women in workforce
replacing teenage boys as switchboard operators). One of the main reasons that these teenage
boys seemed so rude was because they were frustrated with the telephone connection problems.
Id. In fact, when women replaced these boys as switchboard operators, the women were also
frustrated at these connection problems, as one reported saying "number please" over 120 times
per hour for eight hours a day because she could not understand the person on the other line. Id.
14 See United States v. Lampley, 573 F.2d 783, 786 (3d Cir. 1978) (charging defendant with
making threatening and harassing interstate telephone calls). Because the defendant, who
previously dated the plaintiff for a few weeks, launched a "telephonic assault" on the plaintiff and
her family, he was later guilty of violating 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) and 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(D). Id.
at 785-86. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (1994) ("Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign
commerce any communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure
the person of another, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both."), with 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(D) (2003) ("Whoever... makes or causes the telephone of
another repeatedly or continuously to ring, with intent to harass any person at the called
number.., shall be fined under title 18, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both."). See
United States v. Bowker, 372 F.3d 365, 370 (6th Cir. 2004) (recognizing constitutionality of
federal harassing telephone law); see generally Telecommunications Law: Telephone
Harassment, LAWYERS.COM, http://communications-media.lawyers.com/telecommunicationslaw/telephone-harassment.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2017) [hereinafter Telecommunications
Law: Telephone Harassment] (explaining characteristics of harassing telephone call). Frequent
calls by telemarketers or heavy breathing from the caller are two examples of calls that can be
considered either annoying or non-annoying calls depending on the person answering the phone.
Id. However, calls relating to business matters or family affairs are usually not considered
harassing, irrespective of how annoying the call may be to that particular individual. Id.
15 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-196 (2015) (defining telephone harassment in North Carolina).
This law is arguably in accordance with First Amendment principles because it prohibits conduct,
not the "communication of thoughts or ideas." State v. Camp, 295 S.E.2d 766, 768 (N.C. Ct. App.
1982) (upholding North Carolina's Harassing Telephone Statute as defendant harassed sheriff
department employees through telephone); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.61.230 (2015) (explaining
telephone harassment in Washington). The Washington codes states:
(1) Every person who, with intent to harass, intimidate, torment, or embarrass any
other person, shall make a telephone call to such other person: (a) Using any lewd,
lascivious, profane... language... or... (c) Threatening to inflict injury on the
person or property of the person called ... is guilty of a gross misdemeanor.
Id. In fact under the statute, one does not have to prove that the caller had the intent to harass; as
long as the evidence shows an intent to harass, this intent can be enough to charge the harasser.
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However, statutes that criminalize harassment via telephone calls
encounter challenges to their validity on the grounds of vagueness, and
lend themselves to numerous types of interpretation. 16 For example, the

use of terms such as "obscene" and "profane" to describe the type of calls
prohibited are academic terms that are difficult to apply in specific
State v. Alphonse, 197 P.3d 1211, 1216 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008) (arguing that because defendant
threatened to kill plaintiff, such facts show intent to harass); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-183 (2015)
(describing telephone harassment in Connecticut). The Connecticut law states:
[A] person is guilty of harassment in the second degree when: (1) By telephone, he
addresses another in or uses indecent or obscene language; or (2) with intent to harass,
annoy or alarm another person, he communicates with a person by telegraph or mail,
by electronically transmitting a facsimile through connection with a telephone network,
by computer network ...or (3) with intent to harass.

..

he makes a telephone call...

in a manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm.
Id.This Connecticut law does not only regulate speech, but also the content of the call. State v.
Moulton, 78 A.3d 55, 69-71 (Conn. 2013) (holding Connecticut Harassing Telephone Statute
prohibits harassing speech and conduct). One could consider the content of the call when
determining if the call was made "in a manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm." Id.at 61. See
generally Mark S. Nadel, Rings of Privacy: Unsolicited Telephone Calls and the Right of
Privacy, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 99, 102-07 (1986) (demonstrating legislators and court's view of

harassing telephone statutes). The Supreme Court has held that individuals should be left alone at
their residence and deserve privacy, particularly regarding unsolicited telephone calls. Id.
Legislators responded to this ruling by passing legislation regarding harassing telephone calls; in
fact, some states prevent calls from being made at "inconvenient hours" while bills in twenty-two
states limit calls made from telemarketers. Id.at 107-09. Invariably, these laws should not
encroach on the freedom of speech under the First Amendment and "further inquiry is often
necessary to determine the legality of a particular piece of protective legislation." Id. at 104; see
Telecommunications Law: Telephone Harassment, supra note 14 (highlighting characteristics of

harassing telephone calls and how they act as unwelcome intrusions on privacy). Some of these
characteristics include calls that continually ring, calls that only consist of heavy breathing on the
other line, and calls that include obscene comments. Id.Finally, the timing and frequency of the
call may also be important in determining whether the call was harassing. Id.
16 See Royall, supra note 12, at 1403 (arguing that vagueness in harassing telephone laws
subjects such laws to constitutional challenge). Specifically, the Fourteenth Amendment bans
vague and overbroad laws. Id.at 1405-06. Vague laws are those where people "of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." Id.(quoting
Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)). Overly broad laws are those that forbid
not only potentially criminal behavior, but also behavior protected by the First Amendment. Id.
See also Spears v. State, 337 So. 2d 977, 980 (Fla. 1976) (quoting Lewis v. New Orleans, 415
U.S. 130, 134 (1974)) ("Where a legislative enactment 'is susceptible of application to protected
speech,: it is constitutionally overbroad and therefore is facially invalid."'). But see Info.
Providers' Coal. for Def. of First Amendment v. FCC, 928 F.2d 866, 874 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding
Harassment Telephone Law was not unconstitutional as term "indecent" was not vague). See
generally Radford v. Webb, 446 F. Supp. 608, 610-11 (W.D.N.C. 1978) (citations omitted) ("A
statute whose terms are thus susceptible of constitutional as well as unconstitutional application
can only survive if it has been authoritatively construed to exclude speech which, though vulgar
or offensive, is protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments."). In particular, the court here
ruled that because the statute restricted not only obscene speech, but also words that some
considered vulgar, it represented a "sweeping prohibition" that would restrict even the ordinary
obscene phone call. Id.Provisions of the statute did not differentiate between speech that was
abusive and non-abusive; and as such, the court declared the statute unconstitutional. Id.
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circumstances. 17 Nonetheless, telephone harassment laws have had great
implications in our society today and act as a model for other harassment

laws such as cyberbullying statutes."'
B. Cyberbullying
Cyberbullying received national recognition after the suicide of
thirteen-year-old Megan Meier, who received numerous insulting messages
on her MySpace account that ultimately led to her suicide in 2006.19
However, when the incident arose in 2007, local law enforcement said that
the crime, while it "might've been rude, it might've been immature ... it
wasn't illegal." 20 Cyberbullying has now become more prevalent, as more
17 Compare Royall, supra note 12, at 1423 (recognizing ambiguity in defining "offensive
content"), with State v. Ray, 733 P.2d 28, 29-30 (Or. 1987) (quoting State v. Moyle, 705 P.2d
740, 745-46 (Or. 1985)) ("The constitutional prohibition against laws restraining speech or
writing cannot be evaded... by phrasing statutes so as to prohibit 'causing another person to see'
or 'to hear' . . . legislative power to select the objectives of legislation is plenary, except as it is
limited by the state and federal constitutions.").
" See State v. Bishop, 774 S.E.2d 337, 343 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015), overruled by State v.
Bishop, 787 S.E.2d 814 (N.C. 2016) (recognizing telephone and Internet used as mechanisms for
harassing conduct).
19See King, supra note 1, at 846-47 (describing dangerous implications of cyberbullying).
Before her suicide, Meier was in an online relationship with a fellow teen, who she met online.
Id. The relationship soon deteriorated as Meier received "cruel and insulting attacks" in person
and online that eventually led her to commit suicide. Id. Ironically, the purported online teen
never existed; rather, the perpetrator was Lori Drew, a forty-seven year-old mother who wanted
to find out more about Meier's opinion of her own daughter. Id. Meier suffered from clinical
depression, which worsened through the online identity that Drew concocted. Id.; see generally
Donna St. George, Cyber-bullying Linked to Spike in Depression, WASH. POST (Sept. 21, 2010),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/20/AR2010092006150.html
(demonstrating increase in depression as bullying increases). Through social media cites, such as
Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram, victims of bullying are at a large. Id.; Will & Clayburn, supra
note 1 (explaining effects of cyberbullying and stalking via cell phones on teenagers). Not only
can cyberbullying exacerbate depression in a child, but it can also affect a teenager's social life
and academic performance in school. Will & Clayburn, supra note 1; Cyber-Bullying and its
Effect on Our Youth, AM.
OSThOPATHIC ASS'N, http://www.osteopathic.org/osteopathichealth/about-your-healtl/health-conditions-libray/general-healthl/Pages/cyber-bullying.aspx (last
visited June 2, 2016) (highlighting emotional and psychological effects associated with
cyberbullying amongst children). Cyberbullying is just as destructive on a child's development
as traditional forms of bullying. Id. According to Dr. Jennifer N. Caudle, DO, "[k]ids who are
bullied are likely to experience anxiety, depression, loneliness, unhappiness, and poor sleep." Id.
Additionally, most children will not admit to being bullied because they feel embarrassed about
the situation; thus, sometimes, cyberbully actions against a child will continue and not be
resolved. Id.
20 Christopher Maag, A Hoax Turned FatalDraws Anger But No Charges, N.Y. TIES (Nov.

28, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/28/us/28hoax.html? r-O (demonstrating no laws
existed to hold perpetrator accountable for Meier's suicide). Meier's local town board passed an
ordinance after Meier's death stating that an individual could face a fine of $500 and receive a
ninety day imprisonment for Internet harassment. Id. According to Mayor Pam Fogarty, while
this law did not amount to much, it was "the most [the Board] could do." Id.
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children experience it through increased social media and cell phone use. 21
Consequently, after Meier's tragic death and an increase in cyberbullying
incidents, numerous jurisdictions sought to pass legislation to criminalize
internet harassment.2 2 Massachusetts became one of these jurisdictions
21

See S. Cal Rose, Legislative Note, From LOL to Three Months in Jail: Examining the

Validity and ConstitutionalBoundaries of the Arkansas Cyberbullying Act of 2011, 65 ARK. L.
REV. 1001, 1004 (2012) (providing statistics of cyberbullying victims). Specifically, 43% of
teens were victims of cyberbullying in 2006, but only 10% of cyberbullying victims reported the
bullying incident to the authorities. Id. See also The Rise in Cyberbullying, supra note 7
(explaining faqade of internet may show why cyberbullying has increased over last decade).
When teenagers or young adults post a harassing or cruel message or picture online, they may or
may not see it as harassment or cyberbullying. Id. In fact, they may think that the comment or
picture is just a joke. Id. Nevertheless, because this comment or post is conducted online, the
actor's intent is impossible to determine. Id.; Chris Michaud, Cyberbullying a Problem Around
the Globe: Poll, REUTERS (Jan. 11, 2012, 4:28 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/uscyberbullying-poll-idUSTRE80A1FX20120111
(indicating global citizens desire targeted
response to cyberbullying). In particular, 82% of Americans know about cyberbullying and more
than three-quarters of individuals questioned in the Reuters poll said that cyberbullying
"warranted special attention and efforts from parents and schools" since cyberbullying is different
from other forms of harassment. Michaud, supra. Additionally, 10% of parents globally
responded to the poll saying that their child had been cyberbullied. Michaud, supra. See
generally Stop Cyberbullying Before it Starts, NAT'L CRIME PREVENTION COUNCIL,
http://www.ncpc.org/resources/files/pdf/bullying/cyberbullying.pdf (last visited June 2, 2016)
(advocating for parents to help their children against cyberbullying attacks). Current studies
show that 43% of teens were cyberbully victims; in fact, over 50% of teens felt angry when they
were cyberbullied, while 15% were scared over specific cyberbullying instances. Id. To reduce
anger and fear among children, parents should teach their children about cyberbullying and
monitor their online activities so that they do not become either the victims of cyberbullying or
the cyberbullies themselves. Id. See generally What is Cyberbullying, STOPBULLY1NG.GOV,
http://www.stopbullying.gov/cyberbullying/what-is-it/index.html#effectsofcyberbullying
(last
visited June 2, 2016) (tracking ways to see if one's child is victim of cyberbullying or is
cyberbully themselves). Some signs used to determine if a child is a victim of cyberbullying
include lower self-esteem, self-destructive behaviors, and poor grades. Id; Stop Cyberbullying,
WIRED SAFETY.ORG,

http://www.stopcyberbullying.org/whydo kidscyberbullyeach other.html (last visited June 2,
2016) (addressing additional reasons why child is cyberbullying others).
For example,
cyberbullies tend to bully others online because of their own feelings of anger or to get a reaction
from their victim to boost their reputation or remind others of their place in the school
community. Stop Cyberbullying, supra. Regardless, the motivations to cyberbully vary
significantly and, as such, responses to control cyberbullying must account for these variations.
Stop Cyberbullying supra. Additionally, although cyberbullying occurs to people of all ages,
many victims are usually teenagers. See Rose, supra, at 1004 (noting increase in cyberbullying
with internet regulation).
22 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458.1 (2016) (defining cyberbullying in North Carolina).
The
statute says:
(a) Except as otherwise made unlawful by this Article, it shall be unlawful for any
person to use a computer or computer network to do any of the following: (1) With the
intent to intimidate or torment a minor: a. Build a fake profile or Web site; b. Pose as a
minor in: 1. An internet chat room; 2. An electronic mail message; or 3. An instant
message .... (2) With the intent to intimidate or torment a minor or the minor's parent
or guardian: .... c. Use a computer system for repeated, continuing, or sustained
electronic communications, including electronic mail or other transmission, to a
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after the death of, Phoebe Prince, a high school student who committed
suicide after she was harassed online by her fellow classmates. 23 In
response to this tragic incident, Massachusetts legislatures defined
cyberbullying in "An Act Relative to Bullying in Schools" to confront the
issue of cyberbullying in schools throughout the State.24 This law has
"nor ....(b) Any person who violates this section shall be guilty of cyber-bullying,
which offense shall be punishable as a Class 1 misdemeanor if the defendant is 18
years of age or older at the time the offense is committed, If the defendant is under the
age of 18 at the time the offense is committed, the offense shall be punishable as a
Class 2 misdemeanor.
Id.; Bishop, 774 S.E.2d at 342 (ruling statute did not violate First Amendment). North Carolina
has recently analyzed this law in a case of first impression, where the court analyzed whether the
statute criminalized speech protected under the First Amendment. Id. See also ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 5-71-217(b) (2015) ("A person commits the offense of cyberbullying if: (1) He or she transmits,
sends, or posts a communication by electronic means with the purpose to frighten, coerce,
intimidate, threaten, abuse, or harass another person; and (2) [t]he transmission was in furtherance
of severe, repeated, or hostile behavior toward [another] person."). Arkansas passed a
cyberbullying law in response to an incident similar to the Meier story, where in 2009, twelve
year-old Sarah Butler received a host of harassing messages on her MySpace account. See Rose,
supra note 21, at 1007. Specifically, the last of these messages said "that she would be easily
forgotten and that nobody would miss her if she was gone." Id. Because of such disturbing
messages, Butler hanged herself. Id. Similar to the Meier story, prosecutors could not bring
charges against the perpetrator because there was no law against cyberbullying. Id. Therefore, in
2011 Arkansas passed the above cyberbullying statute, looking to the Megan Meier
Cyberbullying Prevention Act for guidance. Id. at 1010-12. The Megan Meier Cyberbullying
Prevention Act criminalizes communications made "with the intent to coerce, intimidate, harass,
or cause substantial emotional distress to a person, using electronic means to support severe,
repeated and hostile behavior .. " H.R. 1966, 11 1th Cong. (2009). Although the Act set out to
solve an inherent problem with harassment through the Internet, the Act itself could be argued as
regulating free speech and limiting a broad array of speech that is protected under the First
Amendment. Rose, supra note 21, at 1007. But see The Rise in Cyberbullying, supra note 7
(demonstrating that legislation not doing enough to combat cyberbullying). Here, Professor
Patchin of the University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire argued "the vast majority of cases of
cyberbullying fall short of sort of criminal sanction. And so it really takes... infornal remedies
to both respond and to try to prevent [cyberbullying]." Id.
23 See Russell Goldman, Teens IndictedAfter Allegedly Taunting Girl Who Hanged Herself
ABC NEWS (Mar. 29, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/TheLaw/teens-chargedbullying-mass-girl-kill/story?id-10231357 (detailing suicide of Massachusetts student tormented
by cyberbullying). High school student Phoebe Prince was harassed online by students, who
resented Prince for dating one of the school's football players. Id. Analogous to the death of
Megan Meier, there was no cyberbullying statute in Massachusetts at the time to charge the
cyberbullies for their actions. Id. In response, the Massachusetts legislature sought to pass a law
for public schools to include an anti-bullying curriculum. Id.
24 See An Acting Relative to Bullying in Schools, ch. 92, Acts (defining cyberbullying
and
what schools should do to prevent bullying). According to the Massachusetts legislature under
the above Session Law, cyber-bullying is:
[B]ullying through the use of technology or any electronic communication, which shall
include ... any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data or intelligence
of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photo
electronic or photo optical system, including, but not limited to, electronic mail,
internet communications, instant messages or facsimile communications. Cyber-
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come into question after the death of Conrad Roy III on July 13, 2014;
here, Roy committed suicide after Michelle Carter sent text messages and
Facebook posts persuading Roy to kill himself 25 On July 1,2016, the

bullying shall also include (i) the creation of a web page or blog in which the creator
assumes the identity of another person or (ii) the knowing impersonation of another
person as the author of posted content or messages, if the creation or impersonation
creates any of the conditions enumerated in clauses (i) to (v), inclusive, of the
definition of bullying. Cyber-bullying shall also include the distribution by electronic
means of a communication to more than one person or the posting of material on an
electronic medium that may be accessed by one or more persons, if the distribution or
posting creates any of the conditions enumerated in clauses (i) to (v), inclusive, of the
definition of bullying.
Id. On May 3, 2010, Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick signed this law, which ultimately
contains strict prohibitions on a young person's technology use when centered against another
individual. Massachusetts Bullying Prevention Law, MASS.GOV, http://www.mass.gov/ago/publicsafety/builying-and-cyberbuilying/the-law-and-regulations/massachusetts-bullying-preventionlaw.html (last visited July 21, 2016). The law also seeks to determine and implement appropriate
resources that will "create a school climate in which every student feels safe
in and out of
school." Id. Massachusetts makes clear, however, that the law is meant for all young people, not
just students. Id. Because of the law's detailed description of bullying, it has arguably become a
more inclusive law when dealing with crimes "such as assault and battery, cyber-bullying, and
harassment."
Bullying,
ALTMAN
ALTMAN
ATTORNEYS
AT
LAW,
https://criminal.altmanllp.com/bullying.html (last visited July 21, 2016).
See also Shim
Schoenberg, Massachusetts House Passes Updated Anti-Bullying Bill, MASSLIVE (Feb. 26, 2014,
4:36
PM),
http://www.masslive.com/politics/index.ssf/20 14/02/massachusetts-housejpasses -ant.html
(showing death of eleven-year-old boy also motivated legislators to pass anti-bullying law). As
Schoenberg explains, bullying became a major problem after the deaths of Phoebe Prince in 2010
and Carl Walker Hoover in 2009. Id. Specifically, Hoover was a 6th grader who was bullied
persistently by fellow classmates. Anne-Gerard Flynn, Springfield Bullying Suicide Victim Carl
Walker-Hoover to be Remembered at Road Race, MASSLIVE (Sept. 1, 2010, 10:38 PM),
http://www.masslive.com/news/index.ssf/2010/09/springfield builying-suicide v.htm.
A year
after Prince committed suicide, Massachusetts legislators signed the above anti-bullying law,
requiring the Department of Elementary and Secondary Education to submit data on bullying to
the Massachusetts Attorney General and schools to implement programs against bullying and
cyberbullying. Schoenberg, supra. But see Daniel Adams & Sarah Black, Massachusetts AntiBullying Law Seen as Unfunded, Ineffective, MASS LIVE (July 21, 2013, 5:00 AM),
http://www.masslive.com/news/index.ssf/2013/07/massachusettsanti-bullyingla 1.html
(arguing that promise of law to address bullying and deaths of students has been unmet). While
educators agree that bullying has increased with the use of technology, and reporting of bullying
incidents has also increased, there is still an absence of reporting requirements for such incidents
in schools. Id. In fact, there is no requirement that schools gather statistics on bullying incidents
and send them to the State; rather, only teachers are mandated to report bullying incidents to the
principal, which does not accurately provide a baseline to assess how to address bullying and
cyberbullying. Id. Even if educators and parents try to argue for schools to record more statistics
on cyberbullying, such statistics may not be the answer; and as Mary Lou Bergeron- Assistant
Superintendent of Lawrence Public Schools stated, "[a]dding one more [statistical requirement
for cyberbullying] is not, maybe, going to change the approach and how we're dealing with
[bullying]." Id.
25 See Massachusetts' Highest Court Rules Girl Accused of Texting Boyfriend, Urging
Suicide
Must
Stand
Trial,
FOx
6
Now
(July
4,
2016),
http://fox6now.com/2016/07/04/massachusetts-highest-court-rules-girl-accused-of-texting-
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Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ("SJC") ruled that Carter must stand
trial facing a charge for manslaughter based on her text messages to Roy. 26
Nonetheless, Carter's attorney claimed that Carter's texts, while suggesting
a "systematic campaign of coercion" targeting Roy's insecurities, were
protected by the First Amendment; thus, although Massachusetts legislators
have passed the aforementioned "Act Relative to Bullying in Schools",

there is still debate over whether Carter's speech should be protected or
exposed to criminal punishment.27
Although these statutes have the inherent positive quality of
eliminating cyberbullying, they also have numerous negative qualities; for
example, cyberbullying statutes can limit a broad array of speech protected
under the First Amendment: analogous to the Harassment Telephone
Law. 8
Cyberbullying is also difficult to equate to other forms of
boyfriend-urging-suicide-must-stand-trial/ (detailing facts of case); Commonwealth's Response
to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 2, Commonwealthv. Carter, No. 15YO0001NE (Mass. Dist.
Ct. 2015) (explaining persuasion Carter used in assisting Roy's suicide). A portion of Carter's
text to Roy stated, "[y]ou said your mom saw a suicide thing on your computer and she didn't say
anything. I think she knows ....
Everyone will be sad for a while, but they will get over it and
move on." Commonwealth's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra, at 2.
26 See Massachusetts' Highest Court Rules Girl Accused of Texting Boyfriend, Urging
Suicide Must Stand Trial, supra note 25 (explaining ruling of SJC regarding case). If convicted
of manslaughter, Carter could face twenty years in prison. Id.
21 Id.; see also An Act Relative to Bullying in Schools, supra note 24 (containing full text
of
Massachusetts cyberbullying statute); Emily Bazelon Bullies Beware: MassachusettsJust Passed
the Country's Best Anti-Bullying Law, SLATE
(Apr. 30,
2010,
4:13
PM),
http://primary.slate.com/articles/life/bulle/2010/04/bullies beware.html
(commending
Massachusetts' anti-bullying law). Bazelon emphasizes that bullying can now be done through
text messages and Facebook. Id. Through Massachusetts' inclusion of bullying done through
electronic communication or expression the State has recognized cyberbullying and has taken
action against it. Id. But see Monica Steiner, Cyberbullying in Massachusetts, CRIM. DEF.
LAWYER,
http://www.criminaldefenselawyer.com/resources/cyberbullying-massachusetts.htm
(last visited June 9, 2016) (listing defense when one is charged with cyberbullying). These
defenses include an individual's right to free speech and speech that is not threatening enough to
be prohibited. Id. Additionally, Steiner details the punishment for annoying telephone calls and
electronic communication, which usually involves a fine of up to $500 or three months in jail
depending on the severity of the call or electronic communication. Id.; see also Adams & Black,
supra note 24 (criticizing Massachusetts anti-bullying law).
28 See State v. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d 814, 815 (N.C. 2016) (reversing North Carolina Appeals
Court and stating that cyberbullying statute violates First Amendment rights); Rose, supra note
21, at 1026 (asserting Arkansas Cyberbullying Statute is unconstitutional because it prohibits
broad array of speech). Because the Arkansas legislature failed to clarify what was meant by
"speech that had the purpose to threaten or frighten another," the law could potentially
criminalize "mere... alarming speech, which is expressly prohibited by the First Amendment."
Id. In addition, the law leaves out critical questions such as the way to track anonymous users of
Twitter/Facebook profiles. Id.; Izzy Kalman- Is Our Obsession with Bullying Limiting Freedom of
Speech?,
MERCATORNET
(July
16,
2012),
http://www.mercatornet.com/articles/view/is our obsession with bullying limiting freedom of
_speech (criticizing anti-bullying laws). Kalman concludes that the freedom of speech itself can
be the solution to bullying rather than passing legislation against it. Id. For example, even though
one may say something critical against someone, the latter individual has every right to attack the
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harassment because of the ways in which a cyberbully could harass another
in an indirect, rather than a direct, way.29 In fact, cyberbullying is
extremely different from a direct physical altercation between a bully and
his or her victim, and even different from a harassing telephone call
directed at the victim; thus, it is questionable whether one should be
perpetrator through the freedom of speech. Id. Additionally, Kalman states that if we continue to
block a person's right to say something, he or she will only want to say these prohibited words in
a more vehement way. Id.; Elbert Chu, Should Cyberbullying Be a Crime?, WNYC (Apr. 27,
2012), http://www.wnyc.org/story/302021-should-cyberbullying-be-a-crime/ (noting legislation
may not be correct answer to resolve cyberbullying).
The co-director of the national
Cyberbullying Research Center, Justin Patchin, in fact stated that there are better ways to
criminalize cyberbullying than through a statute. Id. As Patchin notes, teens do not care if there
will be formal punishment for their actions; they will continue to act how they want, like any
other rule that a school official places upon them. Id. See generally Hammond v. Adkisson, 536
F.2d 237, 239 (8th Cir. 1976) (demonstrating that speech must do more than offend to lose
constitutional protections). If all offensive speech went against the First Amendment, then
individuals would not be able to argue or debate with each other. Id. In fact, one of the main
reasons why the Founding Fathers enacted the Free Speech Clause of the U.S. Constitution was to
promote these healthy, lively arguments. Id. Therefore, if offensive speech were limited in the
above way, it would lead to the "standardization of ideas either by legislatures, courts, or
dominant political or community groups." Id.(quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 5
(1949)). But see T.K. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 779 F. Supp. 2d 289, 308 (E.D.N.Y. 2011)
(holding no constitutional right to act like a bully). The First Amendment also provides that the
right to be let alone inherently includes "the right to be free from physical intrusions as well as
psychological attacks." Id. In TK., the court also explains the approach nationwide to control
bullying in schools and defines cyberbullying specifically as "willful and repeated harm inflicted
through the use of computer, cell phone, and other electronic devices." Id. at 299 (quoting Sameer
Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, Overview of Cyberbullying White Paper for the White House
Conference
on
Bullying
Prevention,
21
(Mar.
10,
2011),
http://people.uwec.edu/patchinj/cyberbullying/whitehouseconference-materials Hinduja&Patc
hin.pdf.
29 See Susan W. Brenner & Megan Rehberg, Symposium: Cyberspeech:
Article: "Kiddie
Crime "? The Utility of Criminal Law In Controlling Cyberbullying, 8 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1,
24 (2009) (explaining difference between direct and indirect cyberbullying and its implications on
First Amendment protections). Direct cyberbullying involves situations where the cyberbully
conducts online harassment directly at the victim. Id. An example of direct cyberbullying is
when a cyberbully calls an individual "fat" online. Id. As a result, because this form of
cyberbullying is directed at an individual, it satisfies the same requirement as harassment statutes
such as the Harassing Telephone Law; thus, such harassment statutes can be used to prosecute
cyberbullies. Id. at 25. Indirect cyberbullying is when the cyberbully does not direct the
harassing comment at the individual, but posts a harassing message about the individual in a
public forum. State v. Ellison, 900 N.E.2d 228, 229 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008). In Ellison, a high
school student was charged with cyberbullying after posting a photo of a classmate on MySpace
with the caption, "[m]olested a little boy." Ellison, 900 N.E.2d at 229. Because the student
posted the photo publicly, rather than posting it directly on the victim's profile, the student
conducted an act of indirect cyberbullying. Id. Furthermore, under the telecommunications
statute of which the defendant was charged, the government has the burden to prove that the
defendant had the "specific purpose to harass." Ellison, 900 N.E.2d at 230. The defendant can
meet this burden by "establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that [the defendant's] specific
purpose in making the telecommunication was to harass [the plaintiff]." Id. at 231.
Consequently, since the government could only show that the defendant should have known that
posting such a comment would probably cause harassment, the government did not meet its
burden. Id.at 230.
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criminalized for such an indirect act like cyberbullying. 30 Furthermore,
even if there were cyberbullying statutes enacted nationwide, this would
not mean the cyberbully would automatically face punishment. 3' Rather, it
would still be "up to a prosecutor to make a good case," demonstrating the
heavy responsibility placed on attorneys when confronting and litigating
cyberbullying cases. 32
Finally, support for cyberbullying statutes is
30 See Raychelle Cassada Lohmann, Cyberbullying Versus Traditional Bullying: When

Joking
Crosses
the
Line,
PSYCHOL.
TODAY
(May
14,
2012),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/teen-angst/201205/cyberbullying-versus-traditionalbullying (explaining difference between traditional bullying and cyberbullying). While standard
bullying normally includes a pre-meditated, aggressive action focusing on the victim and desiring
control over the victim, cyberbullying might or might not have these features. Id. Moreover,
traditional bullying is performed face-to-face against the victim, whereas cyberbullying occurs
through "the use of cell phones/Smartphone's, computers/tablets, and other electronic devices
(including Wi-Fi gaming devices)." Id. Finally in cyberbullying, the cyberbully can post the
harassing message so that multiple individuals can see the bullying carried out, which might or
might not happen in traditional bullying. Id. See also sources cited supra note 14 (showing
characteristics of harassing telephone calls). Regardless of the type of harassing call that is made,
the important thing to note is that the call is made directly to the person: unlike in cyberbullying
where the harassment can be performed in a public online forum rather than directly at the victim.
See supra sources cited note 29. See generally Cyberbullying: Communication of Threats, UNC
SCH. O L., http://www.unc.edu/courses/2010spring/law/357c/001/Cyberbully/communication-ofthreats.html (last visited June 7, 2016) (showing failure to connect indirect cyberbullying with
threat laws). One form of speech that is not protected as free speech under the First Amendment
is speech that entails a "true threat." Id.; see sources cited infra note 33 (emphasizing that some
people consider First Amendment as privilege not right). However, because "true threat" speech
normally requires that one threaten another directly, and indirect cyberbullying is again conducted
indirectly against another, then most indirect cyberbullying will probably not be considered a
"true threat." See sources cited infra note 41. But see Massachusetts' Highest Court Rules Girl
Accused of Texting Boyfriend, Urging Suicide Must Stand Trial, supra note 25 (describing case
where cyberbullying led to true threat).
31 See Chu, supra note 28 ("When we create a law, it isn't an automatic conviction .....
32 See id. (noting conviction depends on prosecutor's case).
See also Stopping Your
Cyberbully, LAWYERS.COM (Jan. 17, 2013), http://blogs.lawyers.com/2013/01/stopping-yourcyberbully (discussing legal process of introducing cyberbully case). In Stopping Your
Cyberbully, Enrico Schaefer, an internet-law attorney, explained the complicated process in
which a lawyer introduces a cyberbully case. Id. First, Schaefer emphasizes that determining how
much damage is necessary to demonstrate a legal issue is "a big gray area." Id. For example,
simply sending a threatening message to someone else may not be enough to be considered
cyberbullying, even if an individual sends numerous threatening messages with the intent to
annoy or bully. Id. However, one can argue that the sender has engaged in cyberbullying because
most states require the suspect have the "actual intent ... to cause the victim to feel terrorized,
frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed or molested." Id. Nevertheless, determining whether
a suspect possessed the requisite intent is difficult. Id. In fact, Schaefer recommends entering the
perpetrator's mind and analyzing the specific circumstances of his or her background and social
media use to determine the individual's intent. Id. While this could introduce free speech issues,
it also could lead to the correct conclusion that the harasser intended to harm his or her victim. Id.
If this occurs, then the victim must report it to the police and, only after the police determine a
crime has occurred, will they refer the case to an attorney. Id. Finally, Schaefer concludes by
stating that prosecuting against a cyberbully may not be the best solution because the cyberbully
may become more aggressive after the case is introduced. Id. If there is no choice, however,
prosecution may be the only effective method to end cyberbullying attacks. Id.
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tantamount to support for a more refined First Amendment, where freedom
of speech "is employed as a conditional privilege that can be revoked."33
Notwithstanding the negativity surrounding cyberbullying statutes, they
have passed with rapid speed throughout the United States, including in
Massachusetts,
to keep young individuals safe from the serious dangers of
34
harassment.

"3 See Cyberbullying: A Report on Bullying in a DigitalAge, INDEP. DEMOCRATIC CONF. 1,
34
(Sept.
2011),
http://educationnewyork.com/files/final / 20cyberbullyingreport september 2011.pdf
(highlighting emergency of cyberbullying as new form of harassment that must be stopped). The
report emphasizes cyberbullying as a serious threat to society that legislative action must control
and end. Id. at 4. Although the report recognizes the need to protect freedom of speech when
passing cyberbullying legislation, it nonetheless concludes that freedom of speech protections
under the First Amendment "are exactly what enable harmful speech and cruel behavior on the
internet," thus siding with supporters of a more refined First Amendment. Id. at 34-35. But see
The State of the First Amendment: 2014, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER (2014),
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/madison/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/State-of-the-FirstAmendment-2014-report-06-24-14.pdf (demonstrating changes in American thinking of First
Amendment). According to the First Amendment Center's findings, an increasing percentage of
Americans believe that the First Amendment goes too far in protecting rights for citizens while a
declining percentage of Americans believe that the First Amendment does not overextend its
boundaries through the rights that it provides to citizens. Id. Consequently, the report ultimately
supports the transformation of the country's mindset to a more refined First Amendment that
may, in fact, treat free speech as a privilege rather than a right. Id. Nevertheless, in the school
setting many Americans still believe that high school students should exercise First Amendment
rights in the same way as adults. Id. See generally AJ Oatsvall, How to Tell the Difference
Between a Right and a Privilege, VOICES OF LIBERTY (Apr. 22, 2015, 5:17 PM),
http://www.voicesofliberty.com/2015/04/22/how-to-tell-the-difference-between-a-right-and-aprivilege/ (distinguishing between rights and privileges). According to Oatsvall, a privilege is an
entitlement given only to a particular group of people that can be revoked at any time. Id.
Examples of a privilege include political power, wealth, and social status. Id.A right, in contrast,
is held by all people, is universal, and inalienable. Id. Examples of a right include the right to
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, which are found in the United States Declaration of
Independence. Id. Oatsvall also notes that one needs permission to invoke a privilege, whereas a
right can be invoked freely and individually. Id. Ironically, however, Oatsvall stipulates that the
unnecessary use of the freedom of speech is a right rather than a privilege, showing a contrast to
what cyberbully-legislative supporters believe. Id.
" See Cyberbullying: Law and Policy, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS FOUNDATION 1, 2 (2010),
http://www.crfcap.org/images/pdf/cyberbullying.pdf (portraying effects of cyberbullying and
legislative approach to handle phenomenon). Cyberbullying, while involving indirect harassment
online, can also lead to physical violence. Id. at 1-2. For example, Phoebe Prince, a
Massachusetts high school student, was bullied on social media networking sites and face-to-face
by other students. Id. As a result of the bullying, Prince committed suicide. Id. Because of this,
nine students faced criminal charges for their involvement in bullying Prince in person and
through the Internet. Id. In fact, there are currently both criminal and civil laws aimed at
preventing cyberbullies from causing extraneous harm to their victims. Id.at 2, 4.
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III. FACTS
A. Interpretationof Telephone HarassmentLaws

One of the preeminent cases that first demonstrates the validity of
the Telephone Harassment Laws was United States v. Lampley.3 5 In the
case, Lampley had briefly dated Hatlen; but seventeen years after the
relationship ended, Lampley contacted Hatlen, who was now married and
had four children. 3 6 Lampley then explained that he wanted to see Hatlen
again; and when she refused, Lampley declared that he would "make life
miserable for her."3 7 Subsequently, Lampley made ten to twelve harassing

telephone calls a week to Hatlen for approximately a year.3 8 As a result,
Lampley was charged primarily with conducting a harassing interstate
telephone call under 47 U.S.C. § 223(1)(D). 3 9 Lampley later appealed the
decision, arguing that Section 223(1)(D) violated his right to free speech
under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution because the

statute does not say that the telephone call must include harassing
" 573 F.2d 783, 786 (3d Cir. 1978). See United States v. Eckhardt, 466 F.3d 938, 943-44
(11th Cir. 2006) (upholding telephone harassment law). In Eckhardt, Robert Eckhardt made
around 30 harassing telephone calls a week to an employee that worked in his office. Id. at 942.
These harassing calls involved Eckhardt swearing at the worker and making inappropriate
comments. Id. When he was later charged under 47 U.S.C. § 223, Eckhardt argued that the
statute was unconstitutionally vague and that his conduct did not qualify as obscene under the
statute. Id. However, the statute was not unconstitutionally vague because a statute will only be
vague when it "(1) fails 'to provide the kind of notice that will enable ordinary people to
understand what conduct it prohibits' or (2) authorizes or encourages 'arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement."' Id. at 944 (quoting City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56
(1999)). Eckhardt's telephone calls were also obscene because they were "sexually laced" and
did not address a matter of public concern. Id. But see Reynolds v. Jamison- 488 F.3d 756, 769
71 (7th Cir. 2007) (Rovner, J., dissenting) (explaining report of calls not enough to establish
telephone harassment). InJamison, police arrested Reynolds after Jamison provided Officer Dar
with infornation regarding Reynolds' calls, including a computer document of the calls and what
she told Darr about the call. Id. at 769. However, the dissenting justice explained that responses
to interrogatories, affidavits, statements or reports by lawyers and police officers are self-serving
and not enough to base a charge against an individual for a harassing telephone call. Id. at 769-70.
These documents are not enough because they may not tell the entire truth; and here, where the
district court believed that discovery was unnecessary, Officer Darr's report of the incident was
never tested; thus, Reynolds was unable to question Jamison or Darr of the incident. Id. at 770-71.
36 See Lampley, 573 F.2d at 786 (explaining relationship of defendant and Hatlen).
17 Id. In fact, Lampley's declaration demonstrated his intent to harass Hatlen and served
as
sufficient language for the government to charge him under 47 U.S.C. § 223(1)(D) of the
Telephone Harassment Law. See id. at 787.
38 Id. at 786 (demonstrating charge against defendant for making harassing telephone calls).
In fact, it was reported that Lampley screamed obscenities throughout the call and even made
collect calls asking for his "wife, [the plaintiff]" after they had broken up years prior. Id. The
defendant even went so far as to make harassing telephone calls to the plaintiff's mother and
husband. Id.
'9 Id. at 785-86 (charging defendant for violating telephone harassment laws).
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language. 40
Arguably according to Lampley, without the harassing
language requirement, the court charged him for simply communicating
with another; thus, going against his right to free speech. 41 However, the

court did not agree with Lampley; rather, it held that not all speech can be
protected under the First Amendment and in passing Section 223, Congress

had a compelling interest to protect others from fear.42
40

See id. at 786 87 (outlining Lampley's argument); see also 47 U.S.C. §

223(a)(1)(D)(2013)
Prohibited acts generally. Whoever in interstate or foreign communications
...
makes or causes the telephone of another repeatedly or continuously to ring, with intent
to harass any person at the called number ... shall be fined under title 18, United
States Code, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
Id. Therefore, because the statute clearly explains that one needs to call another "with
intent to harass any person," the defendant cannot claim he did not violate the statute.
Lampley, 573 F.2d at 787.
41 See Lampley, 573 F.2d at 786-87 (alleging statute unconstitutional for lack of specificity).
But see, e.g, Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358-59 (2003) (identifying when government can
prohibit speech). For example, under the First Amendment the government can prohibit speech
that may bring about a breach of the peace, imminent lawless action, or a true threat. Id.
Specifically, true threats are "those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious
expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group
of individuals." Id.; Kathleen Ann Ruane, Freedom of Speech and Press: Exceptions to the First
Amendment,
CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH
SERVICE
1,
1-5
(Sept.
8,
2014),
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/95-815.pdf (explaining major exceptions to freedom of speech).
While the First Amendment states that, "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom
of speech ....
which has restricted the government from infringing on society's freedom of
speech, the Amendment does not allow such freedom to extend in all forms of speech. Ruane,
supra. In fact, the Supreme Court declared some speech unprotected by the First Amendment
including speech representing "fighting words," obscenities, and child pornography. Ruane, supra
at 1-5. Specifically, the First Amendment does not protect fighting words because they bring
about a breach of peace and "have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to
whom.., the remark [was] addressed." Ruane, supra at 4 (quoting Chaplinsky v. N.H., 315 U.S.
568, 572 (1942) (affirming state statute consistent with freedom of speech)). Nevertheless, to be
unprotected, the speech must follow the high standard stated above; otherwise, the speech would
be protected under the First Amendment. Ruane, supra.
41 See Lampley, 573 F.2d at 787 (finding that district court properly refused request to charge
on necessity of harassing language). See also United States v. Darsey, 342 F. Supp. 311, 313-14
(E.D. Pa. 1972) (analyzing § 223(1)(D)). There are two conditions one must satisfy to be charged
under the provision of § 223. Id. First, the defendant's calls must be repeated, meaning that they
must be "in close enough proximity to one another to rightly be called a single episode, and not
separated by periods of months or years." Id. Second, the sole purpose of the calls must be to
harass only. Id. See generally Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and
Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2420 (1996) (analyzing strict scrutiny
test). Although the government has not stated a clear definition for what it deems to be a
compelling interest, evidence of a law being underinclusive, such as a law not reaching all forms
of speech it tries to prohibit, may be shown to prove that an interest is not compelling. Id. In
addition, compelling interests include the promotion of a stable political system and the
protection of people that have received discrimination in the past. Id. at 2420-21. Finally, specific
to speech restriction, the government must establish three points: (1) the law advances the interest
it sets out to promote, (2) contains no overinclusiveness (or include speech that it does not mean
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In addition, 47 U.S.C. § 223 has been analyzed in United States v.
Bowker. 43 In Bowker, the defendant sent harassing emails to Tina Knight's
place of employment at WKBN Television in Ohio, made 146 calls within
eight months to WKBN, and made sixteen calls to Knight's residential
phone in a seventeen day period.44 Consequently, Bowker was charged

to prohibit) or underinclusiveness, and (3) the law must be one that restricts speech the least with
no reasonable alternatives that canbe taken. Id. at 2421-23.
4' 372 F.3d 365,365 (6th Cir. 2004).
44 See id. at 371-73 (6th Cir. 2004) (describing substantive facts of case). During these calls,
Bowker revealed himself as Mike, referenced Knight's neighbors, family members, and even
recited her social security number. Id. at 372-73. In addition he said that he would be watching
Knight with binoculars. Id. at 373. As a result, Bowker was charged under 47 U.S.C. §
223(a)(1)(C) which states that anyone who:
(1) in interstate or foreign communications...
(c) makes a telephone call or utilizes a telecommunications device, whether or not
conversation or communication ensues, without disclosing his identity and with
intent to abuse, threaten, or harass any specific person...
shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, or imprisoned not more than two
years, or both.
47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C) (2013). Bowker also sent harassing emails to Knight's place of
employment at WKBN. Bowker, 372 F.3d at 371. In the emails, Bowker made disturbing
comments to Knight saying that he might hide in the bushes and watch her come home. Id.
Consequently, the court charged Bowker with cyberstalking. Id. at 370. Cyberstalking is another
harassment act that is penalized by the legislature under 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2) which states:
Whoever

...

(1) with the intent to kill, injure, harass, intimidate, or place under surveillance
with intent to kill, injure, harass, or intimidate another person, uses the mail, any
interactive computer service or electronic communication service or electronic
communication system of interstate commerce, or any other facility of interstate
or foreign commerce to engage in a course of conduct that
(A) places that person in reasonable fear of the death of or serious
bodily injury to [a person described in clause (i), (ii), or (iii) of
paragraph (1)(A);] or
(B) causes, attempts to cause, or would be reasonably expected to
cause substantial emotional distress to a person described in clause (i),
(ii), or (iii) of paragraph (1)(A) ...
shall be punished as provided in section 2261(b) of this title [18 USCS §
2261(b)].
18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2) (2013). See also United States v. Sayer, 748 F.3d 425, 433-34 (1st Cir.
2014) (explaining elements of cyberstalking statute). Analogous with the Telephone Harassment
Act, here the defendant could be guilty of cyberstalking if he or she had the intent to harass a
victim under surveillance, or cause substantial emotional distress. Id. at 433. Even though Sayer
argued that his conduct should not fall under the statute because it involved online
communications, the court held that Sayer's false online accounts made in Jane Doe's name
served a criminal purpose. Id. at 434. See also United States v. Petrovic, 701 F.3d 849, 853-54
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under 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C) for making a call with the "intent to annoy,
abuse,.., or harass any person... ."..
4
However, Bowker argues that
because Knight recognized his voice, he is not in violation of Section

223(a)(1)(C) since calls under the statute must be made without disclosing
identity.46 Nonetheless, the court found Bowker's argument inadequate
due to the frequency with which he made calls to Knight in an eight-month
period while using a caller identification blocking feature. 47 Additionally,
Bowker made calls to Knight on multiple occasions where no conversation
followed; thus, this supports the argument that his calls were harassing and

(8th Cir. 2012) (holding defendant liable under cyberstalking statute). Here, Petrovic created a
website that publicly displayed dozens of nude photos, sexually explicit videos, and personal
messages of his ex-wife. Id. at 852. He sent packages containing sexually explicit images of his
ex-wife to his ex-wife's relatives and co-workers. Id. at 853. He used these images to harass his
ex-wife; thus, the court convicted him of interstate (or internet/cyberstalking) stalking. Id. at 853
54. But see ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 832 36 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (exploring 47 U.S.C. §
223 with Internet use). In Reno, the court explained numerous ways one can communicate
through the Internet, including one-to-one messaging or real time communication in a chat room.
Id.at 834. However, the court ruled that section 502 of the Communications Decency Act (or 47
U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(B)) was unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Id. at 883. Although the
government has a compelling interest to protect children from "indecent" communication, if its
prohibition "chills the expression of adults, it has overstepped onto" protected First Amendment
rights. Id. at 854. As a result, only obscene communication is prohibited. Id. at 856 60; 47

U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(B) (2013).

45 Bowker, 372 F.3d at 374 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C) (1996)).

41 See id.
(arguing magistrate judge's findings were flawed). While 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C)
requires the caller not to reveal his identity, this does not mean that Bowker would have been free
of all charges under the statute. See 47 U.S.C.S. § 223. For example, Bowker's 146 telephone
calls in eight months would be sufficient to charge him with repeatedly calling another with the
intent to harass under subsection (a)(1)(E) or for making the telephone continuously ring with the
intent to harass under subsection (a)(1)(D). See id.
47 See Bowker, 372 F.3d at 375 (finding defendant's argument without merit). Bowker's
number was unrecognizable in telephone records. Id.at 373. For example, when he called
Knight's home telephone in August 2001, his number was preceded by the vertical service code,
*67, which allows the caller to block his or her number from others. The use of *67 illustrates
how Bowker used an identification-blocking feature to conceal his identity from Knight. Id.
Furthermore, Bowker identified himself falsely as "Mike" during a call made to Knight's job in
June 2001, further showing that Bowker failed to identify himself. Id. As a result of Bowker
falsely identifying himself to make harassing phone calls, he was arrested and charged under 47
U.S.C. § 223 (C). Id.at 373 74.
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that Knight had no way of identifying him as the caller. 48 Subsequently,
the court convicted Bowker under the telephone harassment law.49
B. Interpretationof Cyberbullying Statutes
Even in our technologically advanced society with the widespread
use of touch phones, wifi, and social media, courts still use the telephone
harassment law to analyze cyberbullying. 0
For example, in State v.
Bishop,5
the court analyzed North Carolina's recently passed

cyberbullying statute by noting the statute's comparison to the State's
harassing telephone law.5 2 In this case, high school student Dillon Price
48

See Bowker, 372 F.3d at 375 (detailing Bowker's attack on Knight).

According to the

statute, no conversation needs to occur during the call for it to be harassing. 47 U.S.C. §
223(a)(1)(C). Therefore, when the defendant called without speaking, this could still be
considered a harassing telephone call under 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C) if it is proven that such call
was made with an intent to harass. Bowker, 372 F.3d at 375. Moreover, when Bowker argued
that 47 U.S.C. § 223 was unconstitutionally vague, the court rejected this argument analogous
with Lampley. Id. at 382-83; United States v. Lampley, 573 F.2d 783, 787 (3d Cir. 1978). The
court in Bowker looked to the applicable Michigan law defining harassment stating that such
definition is clear, not vague, and would be understandable for a reasonable person. Bowker, 372
F.3d at 380-81 (citing Staley v. Jones, 239 F.3d 769, 791-92 (6th Cir. 2000)).
49 See Bowker, 372 F.3d at 370 (convicting Bowker for his actions under 47 U.S.C.
§
223(a)(1)(C)). Even if it were wrong for the government to rely on the telephone -blocking
feature, which the defendant used to declare a guilty verdict, the court did not charge Bowker
solely for using this feature; rather, he was mainly charged with the intent to harass the plaintiff.
Id. at 375.
50 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.30 (Consol. 2017) (explaining telephone threats in
second
degree). In particular, § 240.30 says, "A person is guilty of aggravated harassment in the second
degree when: ...[w]ith intent to harass or threaten another person, he or she makes a telephone
call, whether or not a conversation ensues, with no purpose of legitimate communication." Id;
State v. Bishop, 774 S.E.2d 337, 343 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015) (using telephone harassment laws
when forming North Carolina's cyberbullying statute); People v. Dixon, 2014 NY005400, 2014
N.Y. Misc. LEXIS at *6 7 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2014) (demonstrating comparison between Albany
County's failed cyberbullying statute and New York's pre-amended aggravated harassment
statute). See Thom File & Camille Ryan, Computer and Internet Use in the United States: 2013,
AMERICAN

COMMUNITY

SURVEY

REPORTS

(Nov.

2014),

http://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/20 14/acs/acs-28.pdf
(demonstrating increased computer and internet use of Americans). The report found that in
2013, 74.4% of American households used the Internet and 78.5% of Americans had a desktop or
laptop computer. Id. at 4. These percentages have increased significantly over the last few
decades compared to 1984 when 8.2% of people had a computer and in 1997, only 18% of
American households used the Internet. Id. Furthermore, 77.7% of these Americans who use the
Internet are between 15-34 years old. Id. Compare Will & Clayborn, supra note 1 (disclosing
increased percentage of teenagers online), with Ain,supra note 1 (demonstrating increased use of
smart phones among teenagers to surf internet).
51 774 S.E.2d 337 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015).
52 See id at 343. By recognizing the analogous nature of the Harassing Telephone Law and
the Cyberbullying statute, the court looked to the constitutionality of the Harassing Telephone
Law to determine if the cyberbullying statute could be equally constitutional. Id. Since the
Harassing Telephone Law prohibited the conduct of making a harassing telephone call, rather
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received negative comments on Facebook from his classmates.53 One of
these classmates was Robert Bishop, who posted numerous comments
than the speech itself, the court held that it was constitutional and not a form of speech protected
under the First Amendment. Id. As a result, since the Cyberbullying statute similarly prohibits
conduct rather than speech, then it can also be deemed constitutional. Id. But see State v. Bishop,
787 S.E.2d 814, 819 (N.C. 2016) (overruling Appeals Court and recognizing unconstitutionality
of North Carolina cyberbullying statute).
" See Bishop, 774 S.E.2d at 340, 349 (explaining facts of case and upholding conviction for
cyberbullying). But see Gauthier v. Manchester Sch. Dist., SAU #37, 123 A.3d 1016, 1020-21
(N.H. 2015) (holding school board innocent even though cyberbullying attack occurred against
student). In this case, student Morgan Graveline received threatening Facebook messages from
another student, which eventually lead to a physical altercation and Morgan's transportation to
the emergency room. Id. at 1017. As a result, Morgan's mother sued the school board for failure
to notify her as a parent of the victim of cyberbullying 48 hours after the bullying incident in
accordance with the Pupil Safety and Violence Prevention statute passed by the New Hampshire
legislature. Id. at 1018. One of the statute's purposes is to provide school boards throughout the
state with a written policy prohibiting acts of bullying including cyberbullying. Id. at 1017.
Specifically, the statute says:
I. Bullying or cyberbullying shall occur when an action or communication as defined
in RSA 193-F:3:
(a) Occurs on, or is delivered to, school property or a school-sponsored activity or
event on or off school property; or
(b) Occurs off of school property or outside of a school-sponsored activity or
event, if the conduct interferes with a pupil's educational opportunities or
substantially disrupts the orderly operations of the school or school-sponsored
activity or event.
II. The school board of each school district and the board of trustees of a chartered
public school shall, no later than 6 months after the effective date of this section, adopt
a written policy prohibiting bullying and cyberbullying. Such policy shall include the
definitions set forth in RSA 193-F:3. The policy shall contain, at a minimum, the
following components:
(a) A statement prohibiting bullying or cyberbullying of a pupil....
(h) A procedure for notification, within 48 hours of the incident report, to the
parent or parents or guardian of a victim of bullying or cyberbullying and the
parent or parents or guardian of the perpetrator of the bullying or cyberbullying.
The content of the notification shall comply with the Family Educational Rights
and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. 1232g.
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 193-F:4(I.)-(II.)(a)(h) (LexisNexis 2017). While the student's action
constituted cyberbullying through Facebook, the anti-bullying policy pursuant to N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 193-F:9 (LexisNexis 2017) specifically states that "[n]othing in this chapter shall
supersede or replace existing rights or remedies under any other general or special law, including
criminal law, nor shall this chapter create a private right of action for enforcement of this chapter
against any school district or chartered public school, or the state." Gauthier, 123 A.3d at 1019
(quoting § 193-F:9). Therefore, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant
school board. Id. at 1021. See generally Sarah Perez, More Cyberbullying on Facebook, Social
Sites
than
Rest
of
Web,
READWRITE
(May
10,
2010),
http://readwrite.com/2010/05/10/morecyberbullyingon facebook social sites
than rest of w
eb (explaining reason for increase in online harassment on Facebook). Considering more young
adults have been subscribing to social media sites, such as Facebook, they are more vulnerable to
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about Price calling him homophobic, homosexual, and stating that Bishop

"never got the chance to slap [Dillon] down before Christmas break." 5 4 As
a result, police charged Bishop with one count of cyberbullying under the
North Carolina Cyberbullying Statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-

458.1(a)(1)(d). 5

However, Bishop argued that the statute was an

overbroad criminalization of protected speech and that the statute, overall,
was unconstitutionally vague on its face .56 The Appeals Court disagreed
with this argument, stating that while the cyberbullying statute may
regulate some aspects of speech, such regulation is valid since the statute's
main purpose is to prohibit the communication of information pertaining to
a minor with the intent to intimidate or torment; consequently, the Appeals
Court held that the statute was constitutional under the First Amendment.5 7

cyberbullying and online harassment acts. Id. According to Perez, 39% of social network users
have been the victim of online harassment. Id. Specifically, the problem of online harassment
was intensified in 2009 when Facebook became more public, allowing profiles to also become
more public, including the activities on those profiles. Id.
54 See Bishop, 774 S.E.2d at 340. In addition, Bishop posted screen shots of his text
messages on his Facebook, further insulting Price. Id. at 340 41. One of these posts included a
picture of Price and his dog with comments saying that his anus was stressed from having penises
in it. Id. Furthermore, because of these harassing posts, his mother witnessed Price beating
himself on the head, throwing things around his bedroom, and crying. Id. When Price's mother
later discovered the harassing posts on her son's cellphone, she immediately contacted law
enforcement, which led to this case. Id.
55 See id.at 341 (alleging defendant intended to torment Dillon on Facebook); see also N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-458.1(a)(1)(d) (2016) ("Except as otherwise made unlawful by this Article, it
shall be unlawful for any person to use a computer or computer network to do any of the
following: With the intent to intimidate or torment a "nor... post or encourage others to post on
the Internet private, personal, or sexual information pertaining to a minor."). But see Bishop, 787
S.E.2d at 821 (holding cyberbullying statute's restriction on speech not narrowly tailored to State
interest, finding statute unconstitutional).
56 See Bishop, 774 S.E.2d at 341 (explaining defendant's argument that statute is overbroad
and vague). The court admitted that determining this issue would be a case of first impression
where it had to analyze whether the State's cyberbullying statute criminalizes protected speech
found in the First Amendment. Id. at 342; see also Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615
(1973) (explaining 'overbreadth' doctrine regarding conduct and speech). If conduct and speech
are involved in a supposedly overbroad statute, "the overbreadth of [the] statute must not only be
real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep."
Broadrick,413 U.S. at 615.
57 See Bishop, 774 S.E.2d at 344-45 (rejecting defendant's argument). See also United States
v. O'Brien 391 U.S. 367, 376 ("We [the court] cannot accept the view that an apparently
limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct
intends thereby to express an idea.... [W]hen speech and nonspeech elements are combined in
the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important government interest in regulating the
nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms."). Besides
an "important" government interest, the Supreme Court has used a multitude of words to describe
such government interest. Id. These words include compelling, paramount, strong, etc. Id. at
376 77. Nevertheless, there has not been a clear definition of what these modifiers truly mean,
especially the modifier "compelling," regarding a compelling government interest. See Volokl
supra note 42, at 2420 (questioning what interest is compelling enough to regulate speech).
Regardless, since the North Carolina General Assembly professed that the statute was simply to
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Additionally in Rosario v. Clark County Sch. Dist, " the District of
Nevada upheld a cyberbullying policy when a student posted obscene
language on his Twitter account.5 9 In Rosario, Juliano Rosario was a
student at Desert Oasis High School in Nevada who played on the school's
basketball team. 60 After the final basketball game of the season, Juliano
and his parents went out for dinner outside the school's campus at a local
restaurant. 6' While eating dinner with his parents, Juliano posted several
vulgar tweets directed at school officials.62 When the tweets were later
discovered, school officials and administrators filed a complaint against
Juliano, charging him under the school's cyberbullying policy. 63 Juliano

then filed this action stating that the above complaint violated his First
Amendment rights.64 While the cyberbullying policy for most of the tweets
that he posted, the court ruled that one of his tweets could not be protected
under the First Amendment, as it signified "obscene material";
thus, for this
65
tweet, Juliano violated the school's cyberbullying policy.

Although the Appeals Court in Bishop and the District Court of
Nevada ruled that their respective cyberbullying policies did not violate
the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, other courts have held that
their states' cyberbullying statutes were unconstitutional and violated the

protect children from the effects of harassment, the court held it was justified to promote the
statute's constitutionality even if regulates some elements of free speech. Bishop, 774 S.E.2d at
344.
" No. 2:13-CV-362 JCM (PAL), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93963 (D. Nev. July 3, 2013).
'9See id.
at *10 11 (explaining court's reasoning behind decision).
60 See id. at *1-2 (discussing factual background of case).
61 See id.
(noting importance of location and time of comments as they relate to school
regulated speech). The defendant argued that the court can regulate off-campus student speech if
it causes a substantial disruption. Id.at *8.
62 Id. at *2, *8. Some of these Tweets included "Mr. Isaacs is a b*tch too;" "I hope Coach
Brown gets f*ck*d in the *ss by 10 black d*cks;" and "F*ck coachbrowns b*tch *ss."
Id.
63 See Rosario, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93963, at *2 (explaining school's response after
discovering Juliano's vulgar tweets).
64 See id.
at *7 8 (outlining plaintiff's argument that school exceeded its authority).
65 Id. at *9 (holding tweet, "I hope Coach brown gets f*ck*d in tha *ss..." was obscene);
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (defining obscene speech). As explained in Miller,
obscene speech cannot receive First Amendment protection and includes speech meets the
following criteria:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (internal citations omitted). See also S. J. W. v. Lee's Summit
R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771, 777 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding schools can control offcampus speech when it reaches campus and causes "substantial disruption").
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Free Speech Clause.66 In fact, in a recent decision by the North Carolina
Supreme Court in State v. Bishop,67 the court overruled the decision of the
North Carolina Appeals Court and held that the State's cyberbullying
statute was unconstitutional and "create[s] a criminal prohibition of
alarming breadth." 68 The North Carolina Supreme Court overruled their
predecessors' unanimous decision by conducting a detailed First
Amendment analysis to determine whether the statute prohibited free
speech. 69 First, the court asked whether the North Carolina cyberbullying
statute, particularly Section (a)(1)(d), prohibited protected speech or
"inherently" expressive conduct; if it did prohibit either of these, then the

statute would be unconstitutional against the First Amendment. 70 Because
the court concluded that the statute prohibited protected speech in the form
of internet positing, the court then debated whether (a)(1)(d) of the
cyberbullying statute is content-based or content-neutral, which ultimately
determines the level of scrutiny that the court must apply when analyzing a
First Amendment issue. 7' In response to this debate, the court held that
66 See People v. Marquan M., 19 N.E.3d 480, 488 (N.Y. 2014) (holding that Albany County

cyberbullying statute is vague). In fact, the Albany County cyberbullying statute was so vague
that it arguably criminalized a broad array of speech that would not normally be considered
cyberbullying. Id. at 486. For example, the statute included prohibitions on speech that are
meant to simply annoy or humiliate another, conducted on multiple forms of electronic
communication devices such as the telephone. Id. Because the cyberbullying statute could even
criminalize telephone conversations simply meant to annoy another, one can see a further
connection between cyberbullying and the Harassment Telephone Laws. Id.
67 787 S.E.2d 814 (N.C. 2016).
68 Id. at 821 (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 474 (2010)) (finding statute
unconstitutional).
69 See id. at 818-21 (asking whether cyberbullying statute burdens free speech, is content
based, and passes strict scrutiny).
70 See id. at 817. Because the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment inherently
provides the right of protected speech, if the North Carolina cyberbullying statute prohibited this
right, the statute would clearly be unconstitutional; thus, the real conflict would be if the statute
prohibited conduct. Id. at 816-18. Courts throughout the country have ruled differently on
whether the First Amendment protects expressive conduct; however, the Supreme Court in
Rumsfeld v. Forumfor Acad. & InstitutionalRights, Inc., held that the First Amendment can only
protect an individual's rights if the conduct was "inherently" expressive. Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at
66. An example of inherently expressive is burning a flag. Id. Nevertheless, such conduct is not
automatically deserving of First Amendment protection, for example, if it involves
communication "integral to criminal conduct." Bishop, 787 S.E.2d at 817 (quoting United States
v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012)). However, at the same time, one cannot be prevented
from acting in a certain way merely because the action was carried out by online communication;
therefore, there is still not a clear answer on what conduct is and is not protected by the First
Amendment. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d at 818.
71 Bishop, 787 S.E.2d at 818 (weighing if posting online is speech or conduct). According to
the North Carolina Supreme Court in Bishop, internet posting is a definitive form of protected
speech analogous to flyers on bulletin boards and pamphlets given to the public. Id. at 817. If a
piece of legislation contains content-based regulations, the court will apply a strict scrutiny
standard to determine whether the statute is constitutional. Id. at 818. However, if a piece of
legislation merely contains content-neutral restrictions, the court will apply intermediate scrutiny
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because the statute defines the speech that it seeks to prohibit, but forces
the court to analyze the content of the communication before it criminalizes
the suspect, the statute is content-based; thus, it must be analyzed through
the strict scrutiny standard.7 2 For the state to succeed in upholding its
cyberbullying statute through strict scrutiny, it must show that the statute
"serves a compelling governmental interest, and that the law is narrowly
tailored to effectuate that interest., 73 While the court held that protecting
children from cyberbullying attacks is definitively a compelling
government interest, the state statute was not narrowly tailored. 74 In other
words, the statute here was not "the least restrictive means" in order to
restrict cyberbullying attacks because it does not require a victim of
cyberbullying to sustain injury as a result of the attack, nor does it define
what conduct is forbidden in the statute. 7' As a result, because the North
Carolina cyberbullying statute did not pass the strict scrutiny test, it
represented a "criminal prohibition of alarming breadth" and was,
therefore, unconstitutional.76

when determining the statute's constitutionality. Id. Content neutral restrictions include "those
governing... the time, manner, or place of First Amendment-protected expression .. " Id.
Nevertheless, in recent years there seems to have been a liberalization in determining whether a
statute's restrictions are content-based; this is evidenced by the holding in Reed v. Town of
Gilbert, where the court defined "several paths" that one can take to conclude that a restriction is
content based and, thus, requires a strict scrutiny analysis. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227-28. Reed also
concluded that if the statute is content based "on its face or when the purpose and justification for
the law are content based," then the strict scrutiny standard will apply when analyzing the
statute's constitutionality. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2228.
72 See Bishop, 787 S.E.2d at 819 (finding cyberbullying statute creates content based
restriction). In fact, the court here was frustrated that it had to analyze the content of the
communication before criminalizing one for cyberbullying. Id.
Because "[t]he statute
criminalizes some messages but not others ... [it] makes it impossible to determine whether the
accused has committed a crime without examining the content of his [or her] communication." Id.
71 Id. at 819 (requiring strict scrutiny review of North Carolina cyberbullying statute).
74 Id. at 822; see Tucker, supra note 7 (explaining that cyberbullying can be prevented in
non-legislative ways). But see supra Part II, B (detailing importance of cyberbullying statutes
due to increased number of suicides amongst teenagers).
75 See Bishop, 787 S.E.2d at 820-21 (holding statute is far beyond government's interest in
protecting children's psychological health). As such, even though Price suffered psychologically
because of the cyberbullying incident, Bishop should not have been charged for going against
North Carolina's cyberbullying statute because the statute never defined what is meant by
intimidating or tormenting conduct. Id. at 821. Therefore, without these definitions, it is
impossible to determine whether Bishop was intimidating or tormenting a minor even if it
arguably seems clear that he was doing so through his vulgar online posts. Id. at 821. As the
court holds, although "[tihe protection of minors' mental well-being may be a compelling
governmental interest ... it is hardly clear that teenagers require protection via the criminal law
from online annoyance." Id. In fact, the court held that if it were to adopt the State's
cyberbullying legislation, it could potentially mean that any information posted online against a
child would be cyberbullying. Id.
76 See Bishop, 787 S.E.2d at 821 22 (finding North Carolina cyberbullying statute
unconstitutional).

318

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XXII

Furthermore, in People v. Marquan M., 77 the court held that the
Albany County cyberbullying statute was unconstitutional.78 In Marquan
M., a high school student anonymously posted sexual photographs and
information about a classmate on Facebook. 79
The classmate was
extremely offended by such posting and as a result, the defendant was
prosecuted for cyberbullying under the Albany County cyberbullying
statute.
When the defendant later argued that the Albany County
cyberbullying statute violated free speech under the First Amendment, the
court agreed and ruled that the statute embraced a wide array of speech that
goes "far beyond the cyberbullying of children."8 '
2
Similarly, in Bell v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch. Bd.'
the dissenting
justices recognized the importance of protecting free speech under the First
Amendment, specifically against school board prohibitions that restricted

77 19 N.E.3d 480 (N.Y. 2014).
71

See id at 488 (holding statute violates First Amendment as law did not help state achieve

its intended goal).
79 See id at 482. In this case, Marquan M. created a Facebook page called "Cohoes Flame"
which contained photographs of his classmates and other peers. Id.at 484. These photographs
also had captions detailing sexual practices of the classmates, their sexual partners, and other
explicit personal information. Id.
" See id at 484, 486 (defining cyberbullying statute in Albany County). Overall, the statute
explained that cyberbullying involved any act of communicating through electronic means with
the intent to harass, annoy, etc. Id. Furthermore, the statute outlawed cyberbullying against
minors or other persons, which was broadly defined to include natural persons, individuals,
corporations, etc. Id.
" See id at 486 (finding statute was too broad). Specifically, the court conceded that while
the federal government has a compelling interest in protecting children from harm, the
government usually has no power to restrict free speech because of its subject matter or content.
Id.at 485. Rather, the government can only prohibit speech if it can be qualified as fighting
words or true threats. Id.at 486. Therefore, because the Albany County Cyberbullying Statute
involved prohibitions on a "variety of constitutionally-protected modes of expression," including
words that may annoy another person instead of restricting itself to fighting words or true threats,
the statute was deemed overbroad, facially invalid, and, thus, unconstitutional under the Free
Speech clause of the First Amendment. Id.at 488. See also People v. Golb, 15 N.E.3d 805, 813
(N.Y. 2014) (noting First Amendment does not prohibit annoying and embarrassing speech).
Here, the court rejected N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.30(1)(a) (Consol. 2017) which states:
[A] person is guilty of aggravated harassment in the second degree when, with intent to
harass, annoy, threaten or alarm another person, [he or she] ... communicates with a
person, anonymously or otherwise, by telephone, by telegraph, or by mail, or by
transmitting or delivering any other form of written communication.
Id.(quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.30 (Consol. 2017)). This statute was rejected because it
ultimately prohibited annoying or alarming speech, which is protected speech under the First
Amendment; thus, the statute was deemed overbroad. Id.; People v. Dietze, 549 N.E.2d 1166,
1168 (N.Y. 1989) ("[A]ny proscription of pure speech must be sharply limited to words which, by
their utterance alone, inflict injury or tend naturally to evoke immediate violence ....
82 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015).
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it.83 In the case, Bell posted a rap video on the Internet outside school
grounds containing threatening and harassing language against two
teachers at his high school.8 4 As a response, the school board suspended
Bell and placed him in an alternative school for nine weeks.8 5 Bell then
sued the school board stating that it took away his right to free speech

83 See id at 404 (noting importance of allowing parents to regulate off-campus speech). In

fact, the dissent says that the majority overlooks Supreme Court precedent, stating that children
are provided with 'significant' First Amendment protection and that the government does not
have any "free-floating power to restrict the ideas to which children may be exposed." Id.
(quoting Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786, 794 (2011)). Additionally, under First
Amendment precedents, the government must prove more than mere negligence with the
harassing or threatening speech before imposing penalties on the individual who made such
threatening speech. Id. at 404-05. See also Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (defining
'true threats' when analyzing whether speech is prohibited under First Amendment). According
to the Black Court, 'true threats' "encompass those statements where the speaker means to
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a
particular individual or group of individuals." Id. Therefore, since these statements include an
intent to commit unlawful violence on another, the First Amendment does not protect this speech
because if protected, then individuals could face the "fear of violence." Id. at 360; D.C. v. R.R.,
182 Cal. App. 4th 1190, 1221 (Cal. App. 2d 2010) (recognizing true threat in cyberbullying
context). Here, R.R. posted a message to D.C. online stating, among other indecent comments,
that he wanted to "rip out [D.C.'s] fucking heart and feed it to [him]." R.R., 182 Cal. App. 4th at
1121. The court concluded that these statements signified true threats to D.C. and were not just
part of a joke, as R.R.'s parents even prohibited him from Internet use and even sent him to a
psychiatrist to discover the central cause of his actions. R.R., 182 Cal. App. 4th at 1222.
84 See Bell, 799 F.3d at 383. Specifically, Bell posted the video on his public Facebook page
and on YouTube for all to listen. Id. Bell threatened violent acts against these teachers because
he believed that the teachers sexually abused female students at the school. Id. Some excerpts of
the rap video include:
[T]his niggha telling students that they sexy, betta watch your back I'm a serve this
nigga, like I serve the junkies with some crack / Quit the damn basketball team / the
coach a pervert / can't stand the truth so to you these lyrics going to hurt[.] What the
hell was they thinking when they hired Mr. R[.] / dreadlock Bobby Hill the second / He
the same see / Talking about you could have went pro to the NFL / Now you just
another pervert coach, fat as hell / Talking about you gangsta / drive your mama's PT
Cruiser/Run up on T-Bizzle II'm going to hit you with my rueger[.]
Id. at 384.
85 See id. at 385-87.

First, Bell was suspended pending a disciplinary-committee hearing

because his video violated the district's administrative disciplinary policy, which views
"'[h]arassment, intimidation, or threatening other students and/or teachers' as a severe
disruption." Id. at 399. After the hearing, the school board determined that since he violated the
above school-district policy, Bell had to attend the county's alternative school for the remainder
of the grading period. Id. at 386. In fact, his video did disrupt the school; particularly, the
teachers mentioned in his video were adversely affected by it. Id. at 388. For example, while
teaching a gym class, Coach R. noticed that more students were going to the gym after the
incident. Id. Furthermore, he said that he could no longer work with the girls' track team because
of the incident and had to teach the boys' team how to help with the girls' team. Id. The video
also affected Coach W., commenting that she was scared because "you never know in today's
society ... what somebody means, [or] how they mean it." Id.
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under the First Amendment.8 6 As a result, the majority argued that this
video contained threatening and harassing language that the federal
government, and in this case the school board, could regulate. 8 7 The
dissent, however, highlighted that minors are entitled to First Amendment
88
protection, including the right to speak about violence and public issues.
86 See id.at 387 (outlining parties' arguments).

Bell also asked to be reinstated to his high

school with "'all privileges to which he was and may be entitled as if no disciplinary action had
been imposed,' and all references to the incident being expunged from his school records." Id.
17 See Bell, 799 F.3d at 389-90. Bell posted the video on his public Facebook
page and on
YouTube for all of the school community to see. Id. at 383, 385. Specifically in the school
setting, the majority argued the First Amendment does not provide students absolute rights to
freedoms of speech because such freedoms should be regulated in light of the school's duty to
"teach[ ] students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior ..."Id.at 390 (quoting Bethel
Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986)). Although the decision in Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., provided that a student may express his or her opinion, such
opinion should still not collide with "the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of
the school and without colliding with the rights of others." Id. at 390 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S.
503, 503, 513 (1969)); Beussink v. Woodland R-IV School District, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1177
(E.D. Mo. 1998) (holding school's punishment of student for disturbing speech on Internet
invalid). Specifically, Beussink created a website off-campus, which vulgarly criticized school
officials; as a result, the school punished Beussink. Id. at 1180. However, the court ruled that
because the website was not materially disruptive of school activities, the school could not punish
Beussink for his off-campus activities online. Id.at 1181. But see Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S.
343, 359 (2003) (explaining when government can prohibit speech). The concurring opinion by
Justice Costa in Bell also brings the discussion into the cyberbullying realm. See Bell, 799 F.3d at
402-03. Although the dissent praises Bell's speech because it combats sexual harassment, the
dissent's ultimate rule to prohibit schools from possessing the authority to punish students for
their off-campus speech online would not only further potential sexual harassment actions, but
would also allow for "ferocious cyberbullying that affect our classrooms to go unchecked." Id. at
403. See generallyShould Off-Campus Cyberbullying be Groundsfor Suspension? The Supreme
Court May
Weigh
Soon,
BULLYING
EDUCATION
in
(Jan.
27,
2012),
http://www.bullyingeducation.org/2012/01/27/should-off-campus-cyberbullying-be-grounds-forsuspension-the-supreme-court-may-weigh-in-soon/ (debating whether school has power to punish
cyberbullies off-campus). One case involved Kara Kowalski, a high school senior, who created a
degrading online profile of another student, stating that the student was a "slut who had herpes."
Id. Because the profile was deemed a targeted attack on another student, the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals ruled Kowalski violated the school's anti-bullying and harassment policy, and such
speech was beyond protection from the First Amendment. Id.
88 See Bell, 799 F.3d at 404 (highlighting importance of free speech). According to the
dissent, because Bell's free speech involved a matter of public concern, students' free speech
should not be restricted. Id.at 411. In fact, speech on matters of public concern, including those
of a violent nature, are "at the heart of the First Amendment's protection." Id. at 406 (quoting
Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451-52 (2011)); see also Watkins v. Bowden, 105 F.3d 1344,
1353 (11th Cir. 1997) (defining speech that involves a matter of public concern). Speech of
public concern involves speech that relates to "a matter of political, social, or other concern to the
community." Watkins, 105 F.3d at 1353. When deciding whether speech involves a matter of
public concern, the court must analyze "the content, form, and context of the speech" to
determine if an illegal prohibition against free speech has occurred. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138,
147-48 (1983)). While the workplace has been a frequent source of speech involving matters of
public concern in recent years, students can also face this form of speech in the school setting. See
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506 (defending students' right to free speech); Bell, 799 F.3d 739 (upholding
school board's disciplinary against a student for rap song recorded off-campus). In particular, the
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Because Bell's video aimed to address the teachers' alleged sexual
misconduct against two students, it could fall under free speech about
violence and public issues.89 In addition, the dissent recognized that the
majority overlooked Supreme Court precedents that restrict the
government's capacity to regulate Internet speech. 90 Although Bell's video
arguably contains threatening language that caused disruption in the school
setting, the video addresses public concern; therefore, one can argue that
the school board inappropriately expanded sanctions in prohibiting Bell's
video and punishing him for its publication. 91
IV. ANALYSIS

There has been a significant transformation in conduct constituting
indirect harassment, as technology increases accessibility to victims on
various platforms. 92 After discussing the Harassment Telephone Laws and
Cyberbullying statutes, it is apparent that society views indirect harassment

speech in Tinker involved a matter of public concern for its time: wearing black armbands in
protest against the Vietnam War. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504. Because it did not disrupt the school's
educational activities, however, it was not seen as threatening or harmful speech, which could be
restricted; rather, it was protected under the First Amendment. Id. at 514. The speech in Tinker
was also important because it was analogous to "pure speech," which is entitled to First
Amendment protection. Id.at 505-06; see also Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786,
794-95 (2011) (holding government has no power to prohibit ideas to which students may be
introduced); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1964) ("[The Court] reject[s] the notion...
that the First and Fourteenth Amendments afford the same kind of freedom to those who would
communicate ideas by conduct such as patrolling, marching, and picketing on streets and
highways, as these amendments afford to those who communicate ideas by pure speech.");
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949) ("[lit has never been deemed an
abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the
conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken,
written, or printed.").
89 Bell, 799 F.3d at 408-10 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (explaining speech about violence and
public issues could be protected under First Amendment).
9' See id. at 404 (arguing inability to regulate internet speech).
Here, the dissent
acknowledges the majority's opinion that school administration now faces new challenges when
establishing regulations against students because of the use of the Internet and other technological
devices in recent years. Id. See also Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 844,
868-70 (1997) (rejecting Communications Decency Act which was part of 47 U. S.C.S. § 223). In
Reno, under 47 U.S.C.S. § 223, it was illegal to send communications to a minor under 18,
through a computer service, that were "patently offensive." Reno, 521 U.S. at 844. However, the
Act included numerous ambiguities and used different terms to describe the prohibited speech. Id.
at 870 71. Such terms ranged from 'indecent' to "patently offensive." Id. Consequently, because
the statute was so vague, the Supreme Court ruled that the Act 'chilled' free speech and was,
therefore, unconstitutional. Id.at 871 72.
91 Bell, 799 F.3d at 408-10 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (stating school board would be given too
much authority if allowed to control Bell's actions).
92 See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text (discussing technology increasing indirect
harassment vulnerability).
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as a significant threat; as such, constituents have supported an increase in
legislation to combat indirect harassment. 93 However, there has been
discussion surrounding how these pieces of legislation adversely affect an
individual's right of protected speech under the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution. 94 In fact, the passage of these laws can
ultimately limit our right to free speech by effectively changing our
common understanding of the First Amendment, despite the law attempting

to effectuate positive change .
Critics of cyberbullying statutes believe that the laws are vague and
unclear about what is prohibited and non-prohibited speech; in fact, critics

state that cyberbullying statutes restrict speech protected under the First
Amendment and ultimately undermine the rights of those seeking to use the

Internet as a way to communicate freely. 96

This results in charging

potential suspects based on speech arguably protected by the First
Amendment. 97 Additionally, a majority of cyberbullying laws do not
include provisions that regulate tracking anonymous users on social media

sites; therefore, it becomes impossible to determine the identities of these
harassers and properly prosecute them in court. 98 Critics further debate
whether these cyberbullying statutes should legally or facially extend to
comments made in a public forum when they are not directed at a specific

9' See King, supra note 1, at 846 49 (2010) (demonstrating positive and negatives of Internet
usage and need for legislative involvement); File & Ryan, supra note 50 (showing increased
Internet usage in recent years); see also case cited supra note 18 and accompanying text
(discussing new means of harassment); Jones, Mitchell, & Finkelhor, supra note 2, at 66 (noting
online harassment).
94 See People v. Marquan M., 19 N.E.3d 480, 486-88 (N.Y. 2014) (holding cyberbullying
statute threatening to one's right of free speech); Royall, supra note 12, at 1403 (challenging
constitutionality of Harassing Telephone laws).
9' See sources cited supra note 33 and accompanying text (arguing that first amendment
interpretation has changed with new legislation intact).
96 See Marquan Al., 19 N.E.3d at 486 (rejecting Albany County cyberbullying statute
because unconstitutional); Rose, supra note 21, at 1007, 1026 (arguing Arkansas cyberbullying
statute could regulate free speech protected under first amendment). In Arkansas, for example,
the local legislature did not define speech that is threatening or harmful, meaning that those
charged under the Arkansas cyberbullying law could be penalized for speech that arguably is
protected under the First Amendment. Rose, supra note 21 at 1007, 1026. See also Royall, supra
note 12, at 1403 (discussing telephone communication); King, supra note 1, at 846
(demonstrating need to balance protections of using Internet with protections afforded under First
Amendment).
97 See The Rise in Cyberbullying, supra note 7 (noting data regarding cyberbullying). With
the increasing use of social media sites, suspects can cyberbully others by posting negative visual
images or commentary of their victims online. Id.; see also sources cited supra note 1 and
accompanying text (explaining increased cyberbullying threat with popular usage of social media
sites).
98 Compare File & Ryan, supra note 50, at 1-2 (finding 74.4% of Americans use Internet),
with Perez, supra note 53 (highlighting recent increase in young adults using social media sites).
See also Rose, supra note 21, at 1026-28 (indicating difficult nature of prosecuting under statute).
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individual. 99 For instance, in State v. Ellison 00 the prosecution carried the
burden of proof to determine whether the suspect had the "specific purpose
to harass" where he posted an annoying comment on a public website. 101
Finally, despite states rapidly passing cyberbullying statues to
protect children and young adults from potentially offensive speech online,
such speech alone cannot fall outside the protection of the First
Amendment. 102 As stated in Hammond v.Adkisson, 103 if isolated offensive
speech was limited and not included under the protections of the First
04
Amendment, then all forms of debates and arguments would be limited.1
Consequently, one of the main purposes of the free speech clauseencouraging debates amongst citizens and challenges to leadership-would
be frustrated if this interpretation was followed. 105 As a result, to maintain
the intent of the Framers of the U.S. Constitution in implementing the
protection of the right to free speech, we must be cautious when drafting
99See Bremer & Rehberg, supra note 29, at 24 (explaining texts can construe different
meaning). For example, if one posts negative comments about another in a public forum on
Facebook instead of on a person's Timeline or through Facebook Messenger, there has been
debate over whether such action is cyberbullying. See id.at 31. While Brenner and Rehberg
would argue that this conduct is indirect cyberbullying that could lead the victim to suffer
negative impacts, including loss of employment, humiliation, and the straining of personal
relationships, the court in State v. Ellison would hold differently. See State v. Ellison, 900 N.E.2d
228, 231 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008); Brenner & Rehberg, supra note 29, at 31-32. Because there was
no proof demonstrating that the perpetrator had the "specific purpose" in harassing the alleged
victim when posting an embarrassing caption to a photo on MySpace, then the perpetrator was
not cyberbullying. See Ellison, 900 N.E.2d at 230-31 (noting action was not cyberbullying).
0 900 N.E.2d 228 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008).
101 See id.
at 230-31 (noting burden of proof government required to show intent). Again, it
may be extremely difficult to determine whether an individual had the specific intent to harass
another, especially when one posts a comment or picture in a public forum. Id.Consequently, if
the individual is found to not have such specific intent, he or she would be unjustly prevented
from freedom of speech rights. Id.at 231 (Painter, J., concurring). As stated in the concurring
opinion by Justice Painter:
[P]osting an annoying but nonthreatening-comment on a website is not a crime
under [the Ohio telecommunications harassment statute] .... The First Amendment
would not allow punishment for making a nonthreatening comment on the Internet, just
as it would not for writing a newspaper article, posting a sign, or speaking on the radio.
Id.
102 See Hammond v. Adkisson 536 F.2d 237, 239 (8th Cir. 1976) ("[W]ords must do more
than offend, cause indignation or anger the addressee to lost the protection of the First
Amendment.").

103 Id. at 237.

See id.(noting to restrict speech for merely provoking or angering individual would be
unconstitutional). Without the protection of free speech, there would be a "standardization of
ideas either by legislatures, courts, or dominant political or community groups." Id.(quoting
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1,4-5 (1949)).
105 See id. at 239-40 (noting protection for dispute speech distinguished
from "fighting
words"). Words even determined to be explicit may not be words that would be "likely to incite
the addressee to a violent reaction under the circumstances of the case." Id.
104
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statutory prohibitions of harassment. 10 6 Otherwise, by extending our
harassment statutes to prohibit merely offensive comments, free speech
will become a privilege and be greatly controlled by expansive

legislation. 107
As the issue in Bell v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch. Bd.108 demonstrates,
our education system has undergone an increase in the level of control of
the right to free speech in school environments. 109 The dissent of Bell
recognized this problem and held that students are entitled to specific First
Amendment protection, including the right to engage in free speech
regarding violence and matters of public concern. 11° Here, the dissent
criticized the majority for overlooking Supreme Court precedents that
restrict the government's ability to regulate Internet speech, particularly
speech involving topics of public concernm."' Without these established
precedents, students would be limited in expressing their opinion

concerning issues of public concern and, therefore, would be forced to
agree with the speech of another. 112 Additionally, the dissent argues that
the majority ignores the most prevalent interpretation of the First
Amendment, which requires the government to show "more than mere
negligence before imposing penalties for so-called 'threatening' speech.""'
Moreover, the video posted by Bell did not lead to a "substantial
disruption" of school activities: the burden of proof needed to prohibit offcampus speech as declared in Tinker.1 14 As a result, by approving of free
speech limitations in its cyberbullying policy, this court upheld a
106See King, supra note 1, at 846 (discussing need for balance regarding constitutional
restrictions).
107 See Tucker, supra note 7 (noting First Amendment concerns in cyber laws).
108 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015).
109 See id. at 389-91 (demonstrating school's control over their students' freedom of speech).

110See id.
at 404 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (stating that matters of public concern occupy First
Amendment values); United States v. Eckhardt, 466 F.3d 938, 944 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding
speech did not involve public concern). Because the speech did not involve a matter of public
concern and, in fact, was laced with sexuality, Eckhardt was guilty of violating the Harassing
Telephone Law. Eckhardt, 466 F.3d at 944. See generally Rosario v. Clark County Sch. Dist., No
2:13-CV-362 JCM (PAL), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93963, at *11-12 (D. Nev. July 3, 2013)
(explaining difference between public and private speech).
111See Bell, 799 F.3d at 403 04 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (reviewing important protections of
public concern speech). "First and foremost, the majority opinion erroneously fails to
acknowledge that Bell's rap song constitutes speech on 'a matter of public concern' and therefore
'occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values."' Id.at 404 (citing
Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011)).
112 See Hammond v. Adkisson_ 536 F.2d 237, 239 (8th Cir. 1976) (stating
importance of
ability to voice one's opinions).
11'See Bell, 799 F.3d at 405 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (citing Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343,

359 (2003)) (explaining negative effects of imposing negligence penalties).
114 See id. (noting that majority ignores Tinker reasoning); Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) (supporting free speech because students' actions did
not cause substantial disruption in school).

2017]

TRANSFORMATION OF INDIRECT HARASSMENT

cyberbullying provision that potentially violated a student's right to free
speech." 5 Again, Bell's speech arguably may have been protected as a
matter of public safety and, further, may represent a ruling that modifies
the meaning of our Freedom to Speech under the First Amendment. 116
Analogous to the cyberbullying statutes, the Harassment Telephone
Laws have been challenged constitutionally for prohibiting rights to free
speech under the First Amendment." 7 While legislatures urged that the
Telephone Harassment Law adhered to the First Amendment because it did
not prohibit "the communication of thoughts or ideas", the law still may be
vague or overbroad." 8
In other words, even though a Harassment
Telephone Law may ban calls involving indecent language or character, it
may be extremely difficult to determine if the call was truly an unwelcome
intrusion upon another.1" 9
Consequently, by charging callers with
telephone harassment,
the
individual
right to free speech via telephone may
0

be chilled.12

However, strong public policy justifications exist to encourage the
12 1
passage of harassment telephone laws and cyberbullying legislation.
First, harassment telephone laws protect others from receiving attacks from
callers via the telephone, as seen in United States v. Lampley. 122 These
115 See Bell, 799 F.3d at 405 06 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (noting censorship of protected
speech); People v. Marquan, M., 19 N.E.3d 480, 486 (N.Y. 2014) (rejecting cyberbullying statute
because embraced wide array of speech). Ultimately, the statute encompassed prohibitions "far
beyond the cyberbullying of children" and prohibited speech that is essentially protected under
the First Amendment. Id. Finally, the statute was deemed vague and was reasonably susceptible
to numerous different interpretations. Id. at 486-87. For example, Harassment Telephone Laws
and Cyberbullying Statutes could prevent obscene or profane language from another. See sources
cited supra note 12 (noting multiple meanings of statutes). Further, these terms are merely
academic and may be difficult to apply to real life scenarios. See supra Part II, A and
accompanying text.
116 See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text (noting protections and meanings of
protected speech).
117 See Royall, supra note 12, at 1403 (discussing telephone issues in indirect harassment).
118 See State v. Camp, 295 S.E.2d 766, 768 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (upholding statute
regulating conduct not communication of ideas); Nadel, supra note 15, at 102-07 (describing
legislative action to pass statutes prohibiting harassing telephone calls). But see Royall, supra
note 12 and accompanying text (noting challenges due to vagueness).
119See Telecommunications Law: Telephone Harassment, supra note 14 (describing
instances when telephone call considered harassing).
121 See Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 134 (1974) (holding law invalid if susceptible
in regulating protected speech); Radford v. Webb, 446 F. Supp. 608, 610-11 (W.D.N.C. 1978)
(discussing concerns with restrictive free speech).
121 See United States v. Lampley, 573 F.2d 783, 785 (3d Cir. 1978) (holding Lampley
guilty
for violating harassing telephone statute because of telephonic attack against victim); The Top Six
Unforgettable Cyberbullying Cases Ever, supra note 2 (listing numerous cases dealing with
suicides caused by cyberbullying); St. George, supra note 19 (showing increase in depression due
to cyberbullying).
122 See Lampley, 573 F.3d at 783; sources cited supra note 14 and accompanying
text
(explaining types of calls at issue).
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attacks can include the caller screaming obscenities during the call, calling
the victim multiple times throughout the day, and calling the victim's
relatives and friends without permission. 123 Therefore, if a repetitive
telephone call reaches a requisite level that would bring about a threat of
peace, and the caller's purpose is to harass the victim, then there is no
protection afforded under the First Amendment; and in that instance, the
harasser may be charged under the Harassment Telephone Law to protect
24
the victim from additional harm or fear. 1

Further, with the increased use of the Internet amongst teenagers
and young adults, which leads to more cyberbullying attacks, there are
strong policy reasons for implementing cyberbullying laws. 125 In 2006,
forty-three percent of children reported that they had been victims of
cyberbullying; and with the increased use of cell phones and social media
in 2016, this percentage has most likely increased. 126 While legislatures
could be inactive in this area and could allow parents to be wholly
responsible for their children, cyberbully legislation is meant to more
effectively combat cyberbullying for children to feel more comfortable in
the school setting. 127 The deaths of victims such as Megan Meier and
Phoebe Prince have raised awareness that cyberbullying leads to a
significant increase in incidents of depression among teenagers,
subsequently leading to suicide. 128 In response to this growing epidemic of
suicides because of cyberbullying, legislation was passed to define the
1
crime of cyberbullying, allowing injured parties to charge the harasser. 29
Without legislation, victims would not be afforded the opportunity to seek

123

See United States v. Eckhardt, 466 F.3d 938, 942 (11th Cir. 2006) (describing frequency

and context of call to be harassing).
124 See sources cited supra note 15 and accompanying text (noting protection for victim
under statute); see also Royall, supra note 12, at 1403 (noting telephone can be instrument for
bringing about fear).
125 See Patchin, supra note 3 (finding dramatic increase in frequency of cyberbullying
incidents);
heightened
126 See
127 See

see also sources cited supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text (explaining
need for statutes addressing cyberbullying).
Rose, supra note 21, at 1004 (reviewing data of reported cyber incidents).
Tucker, supra note 7 (arguing parents should control cyberbullying not legislators).

Additionally, legislators should not be involved in controlling cyberbullying; rather, parents
should bear responsibility in resolving this problem by monitoring their child's internet usage.
Id.; Stop Cyberbullying Before it Starts, supra note 21 (highlighting parents' role in monitoring
children's online activity). Parents' role in preventing cyberbullying are critical, not only to
protect their children from cyberbullying attacks, but also to ensure their children are not
cyberbullying others. Stop Cyberbullying Before it Starts, supra note 21. But see King, supra
note 1, at 846 and accompanying text (arguing both parents and legislators must work together to
find solution to cyberbullying).
121 See St. George, supra note 19 (explaining cyberbullying's effect of depression
on
victims).
129 See sources cited supra note 24 (defining acts of cyberbullying in Massachusetts).
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criminal penalties against their harasser. 3 0 For example, in Massachusetts
after the death of Prince, local legislators created a law for public schools
to include an anti-bullying curriculum to combat cyber harassment.i3
Although certain cyberbullying statutes, such as the Albany County statute
in New York, failed to pass constitutional requirements, many of these
statutes have been upheld because they prohibit specific conduct of
intentionally or tormenting minors rather than prohibiting speech. i32
However, even if a statute included an incidental limitation on speech, this
limitation may be valid when speech combines with conduct because an
important governmental interest exists to regulate the non-speech element,
particularly when the non-speech element threatens harm to another. i33
However, one simply cannot disregard potential incidental
limitations on the First Amendment when implementing cyberbullying
laws. 134 The line between such limitations and protected First Amendment
rights is extremely thin; again, this could lead to a more refined First
Amendment where freedom of speech becomes a privilege that we must
earn rather than a right automatically retained.i35 Although passage of
these laws can be beneficial for individuals facing cyberbullying, we
cannot choose to ignore how this limitation could change our outlook and
meaning of the First Amendment. 136
In particular, courts are now
balancing the line between preventing cyberbullying and protecting First
Amendment rights, as exemplified in the recent reversal of Bishop, where
the court held that the State's cyberbullying law is unconstitutional because
it does not pass the strict scrutiny standard of review. 137 Nonetheless, if
these limits will decrease harassment and promote more peace among
citizens, then such limitation on freedom of speech may be a positive step
130 See Maag, supra note 20 and accompanying text (explaining in greater detail).
131 See Goldman, supra note 23 (explaining death of Prince due to cyberbullying); sources

cited supra note 24 (defining Massachusetts cyberbullying and anti-bullying required conduct).
132 See sources cited supra note 5 (noting Rhode Island statute prohibiting cyberbullying).
133 See United States v. O'Brien 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (ruling nonspeech elements
combined with speech elements, government needs important reason to regulate nonspeech).
134 See sources cited supra note 33 (describing first amendment limitations leading to
transformed interpretation of free speech).
135 See The State of the FirstAmendment, supra note 33 (explaining new perspective where
Americans believe First Amendment overextends in protecting rights). Ultimately, this new
perspective involves the idea of a refined First Amendment where our freedom of speech is no
longer seen as a right, but a privilege that we must earn. Id; AJ Oatsvall, supra note 33 (defining
differences between privileges and rights).
136 See supra note 24 and accompanying text (noting various cyberbullying statutes passed
throughout country). The many suicides that have occurred because of cyberbullying, and the

lack of statutory authority to charge the alleged perpetrators, demonstrates that cyberbullying

statutes are beneficial and crucial. King, supra note 1, at 846 47. But see sources cited supra
note 33 (altering meaning of First Amendment with cyberbullying legislation).
137 See State v. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d 814, 819 21 (N.C. 2016) (holding unconstitutionality of
North Carolina cyberbullying statute).
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in our nation's understanding of the First Amendment. 38 Overall, the
American people must decide whether to change our historical
interpretation of the First Amendment; and, consequently, if the people
decide to choose the interpretation allowing further control, leading to the
implementation of the 'privilege status' for the First Amendment, citizens
must be wary not to allow local and state governments to control more
elements of protected freedoms. 3 9 Hypothetically, if such scenario were to
develop, a slippery slope may lead the government to control
more retained
140
Fathers.
Founding
America's
by
envisioned
than
freedoms
V. CONCLUSION

141

The increased use of the Internet, cell phones, and other
technological devices has led to indirect forms of harassment carried out by
the telephone or by social media outlets, both of which constitute
significant problems facing society today. Whether it is locally here in
Massachusetts, or nationwide, individuals of all ages have suffered because
of this inherent problem that is finally being raised by legislatures and
school boards.
An increase in legislation has ultimately defined the crime of
cyberbullying and harassing telephone calls, and sought to criminalize the
perpetrators of these harassment actions. However, such legislative actions
may not be the most effective solution to handle these problems. Besides
the risk that perpetrators may not be fully punished under this legislation,
cyberbullying and harassing telephone statutes threaten to obscure the fine
line between the right of freedom of speech and the privilege of freedom of
138 See Cyberbullying: A Report on Bullying in a DigitalAge, supra note 33 (explaining

threat of cyberbullying should be stopped through legislative enactments).
139 See Kalman, supra note 28 (noting limitations will usurp freedom of speech).
140 See sources cited supra note 33 (noting complex nature of how to interpret constitutional

amendments).
141 *This paper was drafted before Michelle Carter was found guilty of involuntary
manslaughter on June 16, 2016 at Bristol County Juvenile Court in Massachusetts. Ray Sanchez
& Natisha Lance, Judge Finds Michele Carter Guilty of Manslaughter in Texting Suicide Case,
CNN (June 16, 2017, 3:08 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/16/us/michelle-carter-textingcase/index.html (discussing case and text messages influencing Roy to commit suicide). This
judgment may signify a transfornation of the legal landscape regarding cyberbullying and the
repercussions for sending threatening messages via text or social media to another. See id.
(explaining spark by lawmakers to pass legislation in future that would criminalize Carter's
behavior). Nevertheless, the argument above discussing the Carter case still holds true, as various
organizations, such as the ACLU of Massachusetts, commented that the judgment against Carter
"exceeds the limits of our criminal laws and violates free speech protections guaranteed by the
Massachusetts and U.S. Constitutions." Michelle Carter Text Suicide Trial Verdict: Ghuilty, CBS
NEWS (June 16, 2017, 11:16 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/michelle-carter-text-suicidetrial-verdict-guilty/.
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speech. Furthermore, these indirect harassment statutes may prohibit the
speech of individuals rather than mere conduct, thus threatening our First
Amendment right to free speech.
Nonetheless, due to the dramatic effects of cyberbullying which
has led to multiple suicides, depression, and mental illness amongst
teenagers, our society may be willing to embrace increased legislation on
this issue: even if said legislation transforms our freedom of speech into
more of a privilege than a right. Irrespective of our opinion on this recent
legislation's aim to curb cyberbullying and harassment telephone calls, we
must realize such legislation is inherently close to controlling our protected
right to speech. If there are necessary measures to eliminate the problem of
cyberbullying, harassing telephone calls, and other forms of indirect
harassment, then society may have no viable option but to pass this speech
legislation, which will forever change the historically rooted idea of the
right to freedom of speech.
Brian S. Brazeau

